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THE historic function of the international law of the sea has long been recog-
nized as that of achieving an appropriate balance between the special exclusive
demands of coastal states, and other special claimants, and the general inclusive
demands of all other states in the world arena.1 Historically, the record is
familiar: the oceans of the world were at one time claimed for the exclusive
use of a limited number of states, but concern for the more general interest of the
whole community of states ultimately succeeded in freeing the larger expanses
of the oceans for relatively unhampered use by all.2 The knowledge is equally
familiar, however, that coastal states never surrendered their claim to exclusive
and comprehensive authority over certain adjacent areas of the sea 3 and that,
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1. The reference made in the word "coastal" is geographic. The most important
exclusive claims to the use of the oceans are made by coastal states, but states on occasion
assert exclusive claims over waters far removed from their shores.
By an exclusive claim is meant a claim to authority over an area or over specified
activities which other states cannot share with the claimant state (the category of authority
state A gets, state B cannot get). By such a claim, the claimant state commonly asserts
a competence to apply its authority to all persons in an area or engaged in certain specified
activities, irrespective of the nationality of the person. Examples may be noted in the
claims coastal states make to control over "internal waters" and "territorial sea."
By an inclusive claim is meant a claim to authority over an area or over specified
activities which the claimant state can, by some accommodation to avoid physical interference
in use, share with another (the category of authority state A gets, state B can also get).
By such a claim, the claimant state commonly asserts a competence to apply its authority
only to its own nationals, concedes a comparable authority with respect to the area or
activities to other states with respect to their nationals and demands that other states
reciprocally refrain from the exercise of authority over its nationals and their activities
in the area. Examples may be noted in the claims states make to navigation and fishing
on the "high seas."
2. FULTON, SOVEmaGNTY OF THE SEA 544-45 (1911); SMITH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM
OF THE SEA 3-5 (2d ed. 1950) ; COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 39-54 (3d
rev. ed. 1954) ; PorTER, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 1-96 (1924).
3. FENN, THE ORIGIN OF" THE RIGHT OF FISHERY IN TERRITORIAL WATERS (1926);
CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, BASES OF DiscussIoN 22-33
(League of Nations Pub. No. C.74-M.39.1929.V) (hereinafter cited as BASES OF Dis-
HeinOnline -- 67 Yale L.J. 539 1957-1958
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
even after a consensus developed that states were not to exercise continuing and
comprehensive authority .beyond a relatively narrow belt of such waters, it was
quickly discovered that the occasional exercise of some coastal authority be-
yond this belt had necessarily to be honored if the special interests of the coastal
state were to be given adequate protection.4 Through several centuries of
interaction, of particular claim and general community acceptance or rejection,
a body of principles and process of decision were thus developed which achieved
a compromise between demands of coastal and noncoastal states, roughly cor-
responding to exclusive and inclusive claims, effectively internationalizing in the
common interest a great resource covering two thirds of the earth's surface.
Turning from historic achievement to the contemporary world arena, an
observer cannot fail to note the increasing demands, unparalleled in scope and
complexity, for extension of the exclusive authority of states over the oceans
of the world. To begin with, there are the various new, much protested de-
mands, precipitated by the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, for expanding
the area of internal waters 5 and thus increasing the total water area over which
coastal states assert the most comprehensive authority. 6 By far the most con-
troversial of recent demands, however, and indicative of the greatest change
cussiox) ; International Law Commission, Report, U.N. GENERAL ASSEmBLY OFF. REc.,
10th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 25-49 (Doc. No. A/2934) (1955); JESSUP, THE LAW
OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 7 (1927) (hereinafter cited as
JESSUP).
4. MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN MARGINAL SEAS passn (1929) ; FRANcOIS, SECOND RE-
PORT ON THE REGImE OF THE TERURORIAL SEA 11-17 (U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/61) (1953) ;
LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON THE REG E OF THE HIGH SEAS (U.N. Doc. No. St/LEG/
SER.B/1) (1951); U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATION AND
DOCUMENTS 1956 (1957) (hereinafter cited as U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE); 2fcDougal
& Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64
YALE L.J. 648 (1955); Boggs, National Claims in Adjacent Seas, 41 GEOGRAPHICAL Rv.
185, 191-201 (1951); Mouton, The Continental Shelf, 85 HAGUE ACADEMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COUms (hereinafter cited as HAGUE RECUEIL) 347 (1954).
5. Such terms as "internal waters," "territorial sea," "contiguous zones" and "high
seas" make both a vague factual reference to varying proximity to coasts and to varying
concentrations of the interests of coastal and noncoastal states, and a highly technical,
legalistic reference to certain consequences in the allocation of authority between states
which are assumed to inhere in a designation of specified waters as being appropriately
subsumed under a particular label. The factual reference is vague both because there are
many different authoritative modes of measurement and measures for fixing geographical
location and because what is important for policy, in choosing between modes of measure-
ment and measures, is not simple, dead-weight proximity but the differing degrees of con-
centration of coastal and noncoastal interests which vary only roughly with distance
from the shore. The technical legal reference is vague because so few words cannot
adequately describe all the variables and policies which in fact affect decision or indicate
the variety of alternatives open in most contexts to a decision-maker. For want of bettcr
words, we will, however, continue to use the traditional terms to make a rough geographical
reference and will trust to context to make our exact meaning clear.
6. The Norwegian claim to the use of straight baselines following the general
direction of the coast, sanctioned by the International Court of Justice in Fisheries Case,
Judgment of Dec. 18, 1951, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116, has received the most promincnt
notice and has been followed by the assertions of Cuba, Yugoslavia, Ecuador, Iceland,
(Vol. 67: 539540
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in perspectives, are those to extend the territorial sea in order to secure a
variety of very particular interests sought by claimant states.7 Demands for the
occasional exercise of exclusive authority in variously defined adjacent areas of
the sea--commonly called contiguous zones-are also on the increase.8 Exclusive
claims to develop ocean resources are manifested in demands for exploitation
and conservation of fisheries, both of free-swimming fish and of marine life
attached to the ocean bottom.9 Further, a large number of states presently
advance claims to exclusive authority for the exploitation of oil found in the
continental shelves.1° Such demands, now limited to relatively restricted con-
tinental shelf areas, may very well be extended outward to create new conflicts
and controversy in areas of the open sea not contiguous to any particular state ;11
already, techniques for drilling from nonstationary platforms to a depth of
and most recently, Indonesia. The Russian claim to enclose Peter the Great Bay within
internal waters is another prominent illustration.
7. The numerous claims to exclusive exploitation of fisheries are commonly considered,
despite avowals to the contrary by the claiming states, claims to extend the territorial sea.
The most famous claims are those of Chile, Ecuador and Peru, the so-called CEP claims,
but others have been made by South Korea, Mexico, Argentina, Honduras, Panama, Costa
Rica and El Salvador. Most of this legislation is summarized, and reference made to
responses of other nations, in Oda, New Trends in the Regime of the Seas, 18 ZEITSCHRIFT
FUR AUSLXNDISCHaS OFFENTLISCHEs RECHT riND V6LKERRECHT 61-87 (1957). See also
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 401-501.
In addition to the more exaggerated claims of Latin American states, other nations
have provided for more limited extensions to twelve miles, after adhering to narrower
widths in the past. FRANcoIs, op. cit. supra note 4, at 11-17.
8. See note 4 supra. See also MEmORANDUMA ON THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS (U.N.
Doc. No. A/CN.4/32) (1950). (Since this study is the work of Professor Gidel, it will here-
inafter be cited as GIDbE, MEMORANDUM.)
9. The Australian claim to sedentary fisheries on the continental shelf is the chief
illustration of this type of claim. See Oda, supra note 7. Yugoslavia and Brazil also
claim a contiguous zone for fishing, wholly apart from the continental shelf. U.S. NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE 444, 500-01. Very recently, the Latin American states have contended
that their claims are to an extension of sovereignty only for the purpose of conservation
and do not constitute an extension of the territorial sea. See, e.g., 1 VERBATIM REcoRD
OF THE DEBATE IN THE 6TH COMIrTTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 32 (U.N. Doc. No.
A/Conf.13/19) (1957) (hereinafter cited as VRBATIm RECORD).
10. Claims of competence over submarine areas for this purpose are very recent in
origin; the first was asserted in the Treaty of Paria of 1942 between Great Britain and
Venezuela. However, the chief impetus for the many demands now being made came
from the proclamation by President Truman on September 28, 1945. See Mouton, supra
note 4, at 366-79; FRANKLIN, THE VORLD'S CONTINENTAL SHELVES 88-242 (unpublished
thesis in Yale Law Library 1956).
11. The International Law Commission's conception of the continental shelf adopts the
criterion of exploitability for determining the areas within the exclusive competence of
the coastal state, but adherence to some degree of proximity was apparently also intended.
International Law Commission, Report, U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REC., 11th Sess.,
Supp. No. 9, art. 67. (Doc. No. A/3159) (1956) (hereinafter cited as REPORT). This
report incorporates the Commission's final draft articles concerning the law of the sea.
See comments by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in 1 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW CoMl-
MISSION 1956, 135 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1956 V.3, Vol.I) (hereinafter cited as YEARBOOK).
1958]
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1500 feet have been successfully developed.' 2 In addition, claims to the control
of ocean currents may be expected, with consequent grave effects on the climatic
conditions underlying the economic welfare of nations thousands of miles from
the control zone.' 3 Finally, and most recently, states have made claims to
control flight, navigation and fishing in huge sections of the open ocean for
at least temporarily exclusive purposes, such as the testing of missiles and
nuclear weapons.' 4
Concomitant with this increase in the variety and complexity of demand
for new exclusive authority may be observed an increasing confusion in the
response of authoritative decision-makers in their efforts to achieve economic
compromise and rationally to allocate among the peoples of the world the
actual and potential advantages of a great common resource. Despite the efforts
of international governmental conferences and of international private asso-
ciations of experts in the field, neither the long-term interests of the community
nor the special interests of particular claimants have been successfully clarified. 1r
Perhaps the most striking evidence, although by no means the only illustration
that might be cited, is the work of the International Law Commission whose
final draft articles concerning the law of the sea, proposing most extensive
changes in the historic balancing of exclusive and inclusive claim, 16 were re-
12. See account in N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1957, p. 21, cols. 6-7, of patent covering such
equipment.
13. Russian scientists have referred to the possibility of construction, in conjunction with
the United States, of a dam across the Bering Strait and to the use of atomic pumps to
cause a flow of waters in that strait, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1956, p. 5, col. 2, March 4, 1956,
p. 37, col. 1.
The tremendous potentialities of the future are explicitly noted in Lasswell, The Political
Science of Science, 50 Am. Pol. Sci. Rz-v. 961, 968 (1956).
14. The most controversial of these has been the United States claim to establish a
danger area in the Pacific for conducting nuclear weapons tests. For facts concerning
this claim, see McDougal & Schlei, supra note 4, at 650-53. The United Kingdom also
established a danger zone for a limited period around Christmas Island in the western
Pacific Ocean. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1957, p. 6, col. 5.
The United States and Canada have also asserted authority for limited purposes by
creating air defense identification zones off their respective coasts. For details, see
McDougal & Schlei, supra note 4, at 579-600.
For claim with respect to the testing of missiles, see note 51 infra.
15. The codification of the law of the territorial sea attempted by the Hague Codifi-
cation Conference of 1930 foundered upon the issue of the breadth of the territorial sea.
Nothing was achieved, even concerning those problems upon which general consensus was
possible. Both the Institut de Droit International and the International Law Association
have devoted years of study and debate to various aspects of the law of the sea, particularly
the territorial sea, but have failed to generate much agreement on a governmental level.
The chief effort in the United States is represented by the draft conventions on the terri-
torial sea and piracy produced by the Harvard Research in International Law.
16. The commission draft invites vast new expansions of "internal waters" and
"territorial sea," attempts to rigidify the flexible concept of "contiguous zones" into a single
zone of restricted purpose and narrow width and puts forward an absolutistic notion of
"the freedom of seas" which bears little relation to the relativity of uses actually established
[Vol. 67: 539
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garded by members of the Commission itself as "very vague." 17 This in-
adequacy is greatly accentuated by the failure of the Commission to make any
effort to clarify the factors which might guide decision-makers in attempting
to understand and apply its suggested rules. The restricted viewpoint of the
Commission, clearly revealed in the abstract formulae of the draft articles, was
underlined in the recommendation accompanying the draft articles in the 1956
Report to the General Assembly. There, the Commission suggested that the
General Assembly "summon an international conference of plenipotentiaries
to examine the law of the sea, taking account not only of the legal but also of
the technical, biological, economic and political aspects of the problem."' 8 The
Commission thus apparently regarded its task as its specific formulations sug-
gest, as confined to examination and rearrangement of a flow of traditional
words without recourse to the only considerations which can give such words
significance-the "technical, biological, economic and political aspects."' 9
Some of this confusion in authoritative response is clearly traceable not only
to failure to clarify long-term national interest in terms of common interest,
but also to widely pervasive misconception of the general process of decision
by which controversies concerning the law of the sea have been immemorially
resolved. Highly abstract and ambiguous but allegedly precise doctrines, de-
rived from description of certain past decisions and authoritative utterances,
by the law of the sea and may interfere with appropriate protection of emerging new uses.
See text following note 112 infra.
In our strictures of the collective product of the Commission, necessarily a compromise
of many different views and achieved under difficult conditions, we do not intend to belittle
the many brilliant contributions to the clarification of community interest made by different
individual members of the Commission. The Special Rapporteur, Professor Francois, as
well as others, on occasion fought valiant but losing battles.
Nor do we minimize the potentialities of a collective clarification of policies which takes
all relevant interests and conditions into account and which seeks to project appropriate
prescriptions and procedures into the future under the probable conditions of that future.
The map of the context of relevant interests and factors with which the Commission
operated, obscured in large measure by a curious distinction between "law" or "legal
considerations" and all the factors which in practice affect decision, was simply too limited
and too abstracted from either past or contemporary realities to permit a clear focus upon
community interest.
17. See statements by members Fitzmaurice, Sandstrom, and Rapporteur Francois in
1 YEAROOK 7.
18. REPORT 3. The Rapporteur of the Commission advanced the most radical view of
the restricted competence of the Commission in declaring before the Sixth Committee of
the General Assembly with respect to the controversy over the breadth of the territorial
sea that the International Law Commission had no authority to settle the matter because
it is composed of jurists and "a settlement is largely governed by economic and geo-
graphical factors, which means that only an international conference of plenipotentiaries
has authority to try to work out an agreement .... " 1 VERBATimh RECORD 10.
19. Despite the frequency with which the Commission disavowed attempts at recom-
mendation because a problem involved "extra-legal" factors, its deliberations make plain
that reference was made at times to biological, economic, social and other aspects of
problems. On the whole, however, the Commission seems to have adopted an extremely
narrow view of its function as a body of jurists.
1958]
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are put forward in a rigid dogmatic system as the most rational policy for
future decisions, which must necessarily be reached under vastly changed con-
ditions. Factors which in fact affect decisions are apparently not considered
or at least remain undisclosed; alternative policies made equally authoritative
by past decision are not evaluated; and the appropriate role of past experience
in clarifying policy and appraising alternative possibilities in decision is not
clearly perceived. It hardly seems surprising, therefore, that authoritative
response is frequently no more than simple extrapolation of inherited formulae
into the future, which does not take account of either changes in scientific
knowledge and technology and other significant variables or of the rational
long-term interests of contemporary claimants, coastal and general.20
Probably the most significant source of confusion for both decision-makers
and scholarly observers is the failure to perceive and understand the comple-
mentary nature of the inherited prescriptions of the law of the sea which embody
and secure two sets of competing, and often conflicting, interests-those of
coastal and noncoastal states. The demands of states adjacent to the sea em-
brace the protection and promotion of all the values of a territorially organized
body-politic, customarily summed up in the label "security." It is apparent,
from the perspective of a disinterested observer, that the sea areas adjacent
to a coastal state reflect a relatively greater degree of concentration of interests
-demands plus supporting expectations-in the coastal state than in any other
state.2 ' Among the interests so concentrated may be observed the more signifi-
20. All this confusion is manifest in the many extensive debates about the law of the
sea in recent years. The most significant of these debates are those of the International
Law Commission, see summary records of commission proceedings, including those herein
cited as YEARB0oi, and of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, particularly
those cited herein as VERBATIm REcoRD. See text at notes 111-21 infra.
21. The concentration and dispersal of interests is stressed, not simply propinquity.
The important point is that even propinquity is a relative concept. Distance from shore
may, of course, be expressed in somewhat precise terms of measurement, but what is
important for policy is not mere distance or space but the concentrations of activities
and interests being located. The point was succinctly put in a discussion of authority in
contiguous zones: "The distance from shore at which these powers may be exercised is
determined not by mileage but by the necessity of the littoral state and by the connection
between the interests of its territory and the acts performed on the high seas." HARVARD
RESEARcH DRAFT CONVENTION ox TERRITORIAL WATERS 334 (1929) (hereinafter cited
as HARVARD RESEARCH). Even a brief glance at existing concentrations and dispersals
around the globe should reveal that no set of static zone measurements can do justice
to the community policies at stake in the regulation of shared use.
So much objection has been raised, however, to any generalization of "coastal interests,"
it may perhaps require emphasis that a relative propinquity does make a difference to
policy. Of all the elements in community process-people, resources and institutions-the
most unchanging are the great immovable resources, such as land masses. It is the abiding
strength of the "territoriality principle" of jurisdiction that it authorizes a community
affected in its value processes in high degree by certain activities to exercise any necessary
competence over such activities to protect itself. The more tightly activities become
concentrated near the coasts of a state, obviously the greater the possibilities and proba-
bilities of impact from the waters upon processes upon the land masses. It is accordingly
only in recognition of the fundamental policy underlying the territoriality principle that
[Vol. 67: 539
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cant and thoroughly accepted demands for power: control over access to terri-
torial bases of power, defensive measures, regulation of activities and main-
tenance of order in adjacent waters, enforcement of criminal law; for wealth:
exclusive control over disposition of resources, protection of internal wealth-
producing processes; for well-being: resource controls, inspection procedures,
quarantine, pollution controls; and for enlightenment: scientific investigation
and research. Competing and frequently conflicting with these exclusive coastal
interests are the more general, inclusive interests of all other states in power:
equal access to all the reaches of the oceans, prevention of exclusive domination
of sea areas for gaining influence, maintenance of public order upon the high
seas; in wealth: promotion of the most rational, wealth-conserving and pro-
ducing uses of the sea and its resources; in well-being: establishing and pre-
serving safety and freedom of navigation, allocation of the advantages of the
world's oceans; in skill: increasing the opportunity for developing potentialities
of individuals everywhere; and in enlightenment: preserving the oceans as an
inexpensive and efficient means of transportation and communication.
22
To secure, preserve and accommodate these opposing sets of coastal and non-
coastal interests in all their variety and in all their modalities of conflict, a body
of complementary, highly flexible prescriptions has evolved through centuries
of interaction among claimants and responding authoritative decision-makers.
Thus, the special exclusive interests of the coastal state are expressed in such
familiar concepts as "internal waters," "territorial sea," "contiguous zone,"
"continental shelf," "hot pursuit" and so forth; while the more general inclusive
interests of all other states find expression in such generalizations as "freedom
of navigation and fishing,' ''innocent passage," ''freedom of flight" and so on.
The former set of prescriptions was formulated, and is invoked, to honor the
great variety of claims, both comprehensive and particular, asserted by coastal
states which may interfere with inclusive claims to navigation and fishing. The
latter set of prescriptions, generally grouped under the label of "freedom of
the seas," was formulated, and is invoked, to honor inclusive claims to navi-
the law of the sea honors and protects in coastal states the varying exclusive competences
summed up in the labels "internal waters," "territorial sea" and "contiguous zones." The
point was well made by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, in his argument that the extent of the
territorial sea should be confined to "what is strictly necessary to protect the legitimate
interests of coastal states." He said: "If you [look] back in history to the origins of
States, you will probably find . . . that there was a time when no State made any claim
to jurisdiction over any part of the sea at all. As time went on and as States became
more highly organized, it was found that without some minimum breadth of territorial
sea a stable and organized life for a State would not be possible. At that point the
principle that a State should have exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over a belt
of territorial sea surrounding or along its coasts emerged and became definitely accepted."
I VERBATIM RECORD 238-39. Further, in equal recognition of the declining relevance of
the territoriality principle, as distance from the coasts increases, the law of the sea pro-
gressively decreases, through its accordion-like series of labels--"internal waters," "terri-
torial seas," "contiguous zones" and "high seas," with their rough geographical reference-,
the exclusivity in competence which it will honor in coastal states.
22. For a more detailed formulation of these interests see Boggs, supra note 4, at 187-SR
1958]
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gation, fishing, flying, cable-laying and similar uses, whether in conflict with
each other or with exclusive coastal claims.
23
The grave consequence of the widespread misconception both of the sets
of competing, though common, interests and of the complementary prescriptions
for accommodating conflicts is that the internationalization of a great common
resource, achieved after centuries of effort, is being unnecessarily endangered,
even by scholars who profess the goal of preserving that accomplishment. Clear-
est indication of this consequence of misconception may be seen in the urging,
by both claimant states and supposedly objective observers, of one half of the
structure of inherited prescriptions in dogmatic, normative-ambiguous 24 terms
which exclude recognition of claims long honored by the opposing and equally
authoritative set of prescriptions. Thus, those who seek to protect claims to
the more inclusive uses of the sea may be observed to assert a doctrinaire, abso-
lutistic conception of freedom of the seas and to minimize, if not to ignore
altogether, the complementary half of the law of the sea which protects the exclu-
sive interests of coastal states, as well as to deny on occasion even the necessity
of accommodating competing inclusive uses.25 This viewpoint, which might be
called internationalist myopia, may safely be regarded as having scant prospects
of continued widespread acceptance and, indeed, is more likely to produce
even more extreme claims by states determined to secure opposing exclusive or
inclusive interests. On the other hand, those claimants and observers who
seek to achieve increased protection for, and expansion of, the exclusive claims
of coastal states make new extravagant, monopolistic demands and lay in-
ordinate stress upon the set of prescriptions designed to protect exclusive
interests, while minimizing to the point of extinction the complementary pre-
scriptions developed to secure the more inclusive, noncoastal interests.26 The
adherents of this perspective, which may be appropriately labeled provincial
myopia, apparently fail to realize that their own long-term interests will not
23. See McDougal & Schlei, supra note 4, at 658.
24. A term is normative-ambiguous when it attempts in a single reference to describe
what past decisions have been, to predict what future decisions will be and to state what
future decisions ought to be. For amplification of the confusion engendered by this all-
pervasive ambiguity in legal writing, see Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and
Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
25. The formulation put forward by the International Law Commission adopts such
a conception, although an attempt was made to alleviate some of its rigidities. See text
at notes 156-64 infra. For comparable overemphasis, see statements by Sir Gerald Fitz-
maurice and Jean Spiropoulos in 1 YEARBooK 30, 51, and Sir Gerald in I VERBATIM
RECORD 63. An even more extreme doctrinal view was put forth by the Indian representative
in the Sixth Committee. 1 VERBATIM RECORD 226-33. Among the textwriters, overemphasis
on internationalist perspectives may be found in CoLomBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
SEA (3d rev. ed. 1954). See also Oda, snpra note 7, at 94-95; Reppy, The Grotian Doctrine
of the Freedom of the Seas Reappraised, 19 FORDEAM L. Rv. 243 (1950) ; Margolis, The
Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law, 64 YALE L.J. 629 (1955).
26. See Garaioca, The Continental Shelf and the Extension of the Territorial Sea,
10 MIAMI L.Q. 490 (1956); Padilla-Nervo, 1 YEARBoox 24; Zourek, I id. at 12, 162;
Soviet Union, 1 VERBATIm RECORD 84; Ecuador, 1 id. at 148, 155.
[Vol. 67 :539
HeinOnline -- 67 Yale L.J. 546 1957-1958
1959] CRISIS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA
be served if other states make similar extravagant claims. The consequence
would be extension to huge ocean areas, for the exclusion of or interference
with former inclusive uses, of the exercise of all those well-known components
of comprehensive sovereign authority. Briefly, these include exclusive dispo-
sition of animal and mineral resources, exclusion of vessels seeking passage,
regulation of navigation, competence over events aboard vessels, competence
to prevent belligerent use of neutral waters and application of various coastal
laws and regulations. The suicidal character of this provincial myopia becomes
even more apparent when it is remembered that the traditional device of con-
tiguous zones is available for protection of all the reasonable interests of the
coastal state without endangering the inclusive, common use of the sea.27 From
the perspective of the general community of mankind, each myopia seems
equally unfortunate in its consequences, and both pose a threat to the inter-
nationalization of the oceans which has long served mankind so well.
The first essential step to rational clarification of the general community
interest in both the sharable, inclusive uses and the special, exclusive uses of
the oceans of the world, and to the projection of appropriate authority for the
securing of all interests, is a clear and unambiguous understanding of both
the process of claim, by which interests are asserted, and the process of authori-
tative decision, by which interests are honored and protected.28 Each of these
27. See text at notes 141-54 infra. This point was very cogently made by Mr. Garcia-
Amador, Cuban representative in the Sixth Committee, when he pointed out that more
limited concepts than the territorial sea are available for securing the special interests of
coastal states. 1 VERnATI-m REcoRD 21-23. See also observation of Yugoslavia, I id. at
143, for a similar conception.
23. The importance of such an understanding may be documented by reference to
the article by Professor Gilbert Gidel, in deference to whom we yield to none, on Explosions
Nuclcaires Experien tales et LibertW de la Haute Mer, in FOUNDAMENTAL [siC] PROBLEMS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: FESTScHRiFr FUR JEAN SPIROPOULOS 173 (1957), which rejects
the conclusions of the earlier article, McDougal & Schlei, supra note 4. The principal
theme of Professor Gidel's criticism is that our article argued from the analogy of
contiguous zones that the hydrogen bomb tests were lawful and that this analogy is not
sufficiently relevant to sustain our conclusion. The relevance of an analogy depends of
course upon the degree to which common policy is found to underlie both the analogy and
the new problem, and we believe that, as later sections of this Article will show, a common
policy underlies in high degree both the traditional exercises of authority in contiguous
zones and the hydrogen bomb tests. The main argument we made was not, however, so
much based upon extension of an analogy as upon the understanding of a whole process
of decision in the law of the sea and the appropriate application of that process to a new
problem. Our position was, and we hope that the present Article will aid in establishing
its incontrovertability, that the whole process of decision in the regime of the high seas
had on all past problems established the test of reasonableness for achieving an appropriate
balance between exclusive and inclusive claims and that when this test of reasonableness
was applied to the hydrogen bomb tests, by a weighting of relevant factors under com-
munity criteria, the conclusion should be reached that such tests were lawful. The
argument was, in other words, that the established procedures and general policies of
the law of the sea afforded opportunity for the solution of new problems by the policies
uniquely relevant to them and not by the strained extrapolation of imaginary limitations
derived from past analogies.
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distinguishable processes presents certain participants seeking a great variety
of objectives, acting by different methods, being affected by various constantly
changing conditions, and achieving important effects, both intended and unin-
tended. 29 Initial focus upon the process of claim may clarify the tvo sets of
competing interests asserted by claimant states, exclusive and inclusive, and
identify the more important conditions which must continue to affect the asser-
tions of such claims.30 Similarly, concentration upon the major outlines of the
process of decision may make possible a clarification of the process as one of
flexible adjustment achieved by the appropriate application of a whole series
of relevant general prescriptions, rather than as a rigid body of dogmatic
rules sanctifying either monopoly or anarchy. Such a study may also increase
understanding of the conditions under which the major policy of preserving
the oceans of the world for the fullest, rational, abundant use of all peoples
may continue to be the guiding spirit of authoritative response.
3'
THE PROCESS OF CLAIM
The process of claim may be most conveniently described in terms of certain
participants in the world arena, asserting, for many different objectives, a wide
range of claims to authority over the oceans of the world. The methods em-
ployed include both unilateral assertion and multilateral agreement and are
supported by all the contemporary instruments of policy. The claims, made under
all the changing conditions of the world social processes, have certain observable
effects upon the participants' individual and common values. As an integral
part of this continuous process, participants invoke both authoritative decision-
makers and the application of a great variety of technical concepts to assert
claims concerning the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the various specific demands
they make against each other to exercise authority on or over the oceans.
Participants
The participants in the process of claim include, in one arena or another, all
the actors in the world social process-international governmental organiza-
29. The careful distinction of the two processes is necessary to efficient performance
of all the relevant intellectual tasks, to which we make reference in the text and notes
to follow. Most important, the distinction is necessary to clarify the ambiguity in such
key concepts as "internal waters," "territorial sea," "contiguous zones," "high seas" and
so on, which make a confused and shifting reference both to certain geographic factors
and to certain assumed legal consequences.
30. Clarity about the process of claim may aid an observer in distinguishing the events
to which decision-makers respond from such response (the confusion which permeates all
the traditional terms) and in categorizing controversies in a way best to facilitate the
study and comparison of trends in decision. It may enable him also to assess the importance,
in trend, of the factors giving rise to the multiple contemporary controversies.
31. Clarity about the process of decision may enable an observer to distinguish, and
hence more effectively to perform, the very different intellectual tasks of describing past
trends in decisions, of studying the factors which have in fact affected decisions, of projecting
probable decisions into the future and of recommending what decisions should be-a set
of inquiries much too often compressed into a simple question of what "the law is."
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tions, nation-states, private groups and associations and individual human
beings. The nation-state, as a territorially organized body-politic, continues,
of course, to be the most significant participant because of its special demands
to prescribe and apply authority for and to the other participants. A more
comprehensive inquiry than can be undertaken here might seek to survey the
roles of all the other participants as they influence, and are influenced by, the
nation-state as a claimant of authority.
Objectives
The objectives sought by claimant states embrace all the characteristic demands
of the nation-state for the protection and enhancement of its bases of power
as such demands are projected upon the oceans and include also the various
particular demands which states habitually put forward on behalf of the other,
nongovernmental participants. In brief summary, some of the more significant
of these manifold changing objectives may be related to certain general value
categories.
32
Power is sought by states in advancing claims to control access to their own
territorial base, to secure effective and economical access to the territorial bases
of others and to share in the establishment and administration of a stable
public order of the oceans. In time of war, of course, belligerent states seek
to obtain command of the sea or to deny it to the enemy in order to interdict
enemy commerce and to make his use of the sea for communication as costly
as possible.
Wealth may be seen as a goal in the great congeries of claims relating to
transportation, navigation, fishing and mineral exploitation. One may observe
demands both to limit access to territorial base resources and markets and
to foster ease of access to distant resources and markets.
Enlightenment is pursued as a major goal in attempts to preserve the sea
as a locale for conducting scientific research and exploration and as a cheap
and efficient means of transportation and communication, affording access not
only to the homeland but to the whole globe for the acquisition of new
knowledge.
Well-being is a fundamental objective in the variety of claims directed toward
prevention of plagues and preservation of health, and in certain claims to
fishery exploitation.
Respect is sought in the efforts of a claimant to secure access as an equal
participant, free from discrimination, in all the power-enhancing and wealth-
32. The words used to label these categories-power, wealth, enlightenment, well-
being, respect, skill, solidarity and rectitude-we employ as in common usage, and we ask
the benefit of the presumption of plain and natural meaning. Some set of key terms
for talking about objectives appears indispensable, but we attach no importance to the par-
ticular words. Any set of terms which admits of operational definition by reference to
the manifold, detailed objectives and which aids in ordered inquiry about such objectives
would serve equally well. For further indication how operational meanings may be
assigned to the terms we use, see Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 24; LAsswu.L &
KALAN, PowER AND Socl=Y (1950).
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producing activities of the world which have special reference to the use of
the oceans. The enormous importance attached to fleets, control of ports
and the display of flags, as symbols of status, is commonplace.
Skill has been a traditional objective of states in seeking to assure through
use of the oceans and access to the experience of others a reservoir of trained
maritime and other personnel for purposes of both war and peace.
Solidarity-primary and large group attachments-is embodied in demands
which emphasize the oceans as means of promoting broader identification of
peoples by providing a focus for organization of transnational loyalties and
common sentiment, as in the North Atlantic community.
Rectitude appears as a goal in attempts to reconcile many varying con-
ceptions of right and wrong from many different cultures, both in a law of the
sea and in other standards, for the promotion of co-operative activity.
All these general objectives, as well as the various particular claims to the
exercise of authority to be described, relate at a lower level of abstraction to
very concrete demands by claimants to specific uses of the oceans or ocean
areas, such as the movement of vessels, the taking of fish, the laying of cables
or pipelines, the extraction of minerals, the testing of weapons, the flying of
aircraft, the detention of persons or vessels and so on. In terms of modalities
particularly relevant to the clarification of community policy, such concrete
demands may be further described in any necessary detail as exclusive or
inclusive, as relating to an area close to or distant from the coasts of the claim-
ant state, as substantial or insubstantial in scope of authority demanded, as
relating to the vital or nonvital values of the claimant state, as for permanent
or temporary enjoyment, as appropriate or inappropriate to the economic use
of the area in which asserted, as proportionate or disproportionate to the inter-
ests sought to be protected, as interfering or not interfering with uses by other
states, as causing serious or minor damage to the interests of other states, as
causing avoidable or unavoidable injury and so on. For purposes of anticipating
the flexibility required of a process of decision adequate to resolve contro-
versies about such varying concrete demands for specific uses, it may be empha-
sized that any particular use of the oceans may on occasion interfere with
some other particular use or have an impact on activities upon the land masses
of a state. Interferences are possible both within a single type of use-as in
navigation if ships collide or run into protective installations-and between
different types of use-as when cargo or passenger ships move through a
fishing fleet or pollute fishing waters, or when aircraft and missiles compete
for the same airspace. Absent appropriate accommodation, the range of po-
tential interferences between different uses of the oceans and between all uses
of the oceans and activities upon the land masses is obviously enormous.
Claims to Authority
The specific claims to authority asserted by states in seeking their diverse
objectives may be categorized in terms of the degree of comprehensiveness of
authority claimed and of the geographical area in which it is asserted. For each
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specific claim to authority asserted by a state, there is an opposing counterclaim
by other states asserting both freedom from the claimant's authority and a
competence to exercise their own authority. The comprehensiveness of the
claims asserted by coastal states and the intensity with which other states
counter with opposing claims may be observed'to relate to a varying concen-
tration of exclusive and inclusive interests, which moves roughly from the
shore outward. These opposing claims as to the lawfulness of the authority
asserted constitute the various specific controversies to which authoritative
decision-makers do and must respond. Because of the historic and continuing
importance of coastal propinquity to the varying concentrations of interests,
and hence to relevant policies and explanatory factors, a convenient categori-
zation of specific controversies may emphasize the geographic reference of
asserted claims.
Internal Waters
Coastal states make their most comprehensive claims to authority over
certain immediately adjacent waters, called "internal waters." Practically all
observers agree that claims in this category are as complete and absolute as
those made concerning events upon the land base.33 In most general statement,
the coastal state asserts complete competence to control, in the absence of
agreement otherwise, all access of foreign vessels to internal waters, whatever
the character of the vessel, even to the extreme of arbitrary exclusion. 4 The
opposing claim for freedom from this control finds expression in the allegation
of a right of entry, justified more recently only on the ground of "necessity,"
as by stress of weather.3 5 Even when entry is conceded, coastal states still
assert complete control over the vessel and the events aboard the vessel, 36
subject only to minor deference to the claims of the flag-state on some issues
concerning authority over state-owned vessels and over some events aboard
33. These claims are usually considered in terms of jurisdiction in ports. For views
of governments, see BASES OF DiscussioN 97-101. See also 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 460-61, 502-03 (8th ed., Lauterpacht 1955) (hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIm-LAuTER-
PACHT).
34. See 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE
UNITED STATES 581-82 (2d ed. 1945) (hereinafter cited as HYDE) ; HALL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 66-68 (8th ed., Higgins 1924) ; 1 OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT 321-22; cf. FENWICK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 268 (3d ed. 1948).
A very early example of this type of claim in United States practice is the Act of
May 15, 1820, 3 STAT. 597, excluding foreign armed vessels from all except a number of
named American ports. It is common knowledge that states sometimes prohibit entry
of foreign vessels to ports serving as military. installations. See U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
607.
35. See Jnssup 194-208. A common early argument was that states had a right to
engage in trade with other states and for this purpose had a right of access to foreign
ports. See note 34 supra.
36. J~ssup 144-91 summarizes claims advanced by various states.
1958]
HeinOnline -- 67 Yale L.J. 551 1957-1958
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
private vessels.3 7 It is but an indication of the continual evolution in claim and
counterclaim that the matter of authority over state-owned vessels is presently




States commonly claim authority only slightly less comprehensive than that
for internal waters over the next adjacent waters, called the "territorial sea." 39
In summary, claims here extend to exclusion of passage under certain condi-
tions, exclusive exploitation and disposition of marine resources, exclusion
of flight by aircraft, regulation of navigation in passage, competence over events
aboard vessels and authority to control belligerent use of neutral waters.
40
The claim urged in opposition by far the most vigorously is that of a right to
be free of interference in the passage of ships through the marginal belt, a
right technically referred to as that of "innocent passage. '41 This right is
most particularly urged when the territorial sea includes a strait necessarily
or conveniently used for navigation between waters outside the belt.
42
Boundary Between Internal Waters and the Territorial Sea
Claims to demarcate the boundary between internal waters and the territorial
sea are made both to determine the outer limit of the former and the inner
limit from which the latter is measured. Traditionally, controversies about
this claim have related largely to ordinary indentations into the coastline,
such as bays, but more recently efforts have been made to enclose within
internal waters large expanses off coasts which are deeply indented at more
or less frequent intervals or which have a great number of islands and rocks
37. The conditions underlying both the comprehensive claim of control and the limits
upon its exercise were given classic statement in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). See also Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
38. Lauterpacht, Jurisdictional Inmunities of Foreign States, 28 Bgir. Y.B. INT'L L.
220 (1951). On United States policy, see letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser,
Department of State, to Acting Attorney General, May 19, 1952, 26 DEP'T STATr BULL.
984 (1952).
39. Practically all coastal states characterize their claim over the territorial sea as
one of "sovereignty." See BAsEs OF DIscussIoN 12-17.
40. For a recent collection of national legislation on some of these claims, see U.S.
NAvAL WAR COLLEGE 403-501.
41. JESSUP 118-24. For recent claims concerning United States fishing vessels, see
Selak, Fishing Vessels and the Principle of Innocent Passage, 48 Am. J. INT'L L. 627 (1954).
See also BRIGGS, THE LAw OF NATIONS 354-55 (2d ed. 1952). For problems of innocent
passage during periods of active violence, see MacChesney, The Atmark Incident and
Modern Warfare--"fIn7ocent Passage" in Wartime and the Right of Belligerents To Use
Force To Redress Neutrality Violations, 52 Nw. U.L. RFv. 320 (1957).
42. This was, of course, the major claim of the United Kingdom in the Corfu Channel
Case, Judgment of April 9, 1949, [1949J I.C.J. Rep. 4, and, more recently, has been urged
in connection with coastal authority over the Strait of Tiran. See ISRAELI MINISTRY
FOR FOREIGN AFFIAmS, INroauAioN Division, EGYPTIAN VIOLATIoNs OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 2 (1957).
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in some degree of proximity to the mainland.43 Such efforts now extend to
the enclosure of whole archipelagos. 44 Technically, these claims appear as asser-
tions of particular methods of drawing lines from one physical feature of the
total coastal configuration, including islands and rocks, to other features. Claims
in opposition are that the method asserted involves too great an encroachment
upon the high seas, with the undesirable result of increasing the area over which
exclusive authority is exercised to the detriment of freedom of navigation and
fishing.45 These opposing claims technically appear as averments that the clos-
ing line are too long or that to use a particular physical feature as a base point
of the closing line is impermissible.
Breadth of the Territorial Sea
Claims to establish a particular breadth for the marginal belt over which the
jurisdictional claims already mentioned are to be exercised are today notable
for their extreme variety and drastic effect. 40 Although most of these claims,
indeed by far the great majority of them, assert a breadth of no more than
twelve miles, some states now claim a territorial sea extending out to two hun-
dred miles, and even the claims between three and twelve miles display great
diversity. The main thrust of opposing claims is that some particular extent,
beyond three miles, asserted for the territorial sea is an impermissible ex-
tension of exclusive state authority over the ocean, which secures to the coastal
state an extensive control over fishing and navigation that is unnecessary to
the protection of its special interests.47
High Seas Areas Regarded as Contiguous to the Claimant State
Claims by states to exercise authority for particular purposes beyond the
territorial sea have a long history, but one that is, surprisingly, either ignored
43. For some recent claims, see U.S. NAvAL WA CouLEE 452-54, 458-60, 466-73,
483-88. For a survey of numerous claims to internal waters, with accompanying maps, see
Brief of California in Relation to Report of Special Master of May 21, 1951, pp. 44-63,
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947) (supplemental brief, United States
Supreme Court, Oct. Term, 1951, No. 6, Original).
44. For a survey of claims concerning archipelagos, see EvENSEN, CERTAIN LEGAL
ASPEcTs CONCERNING THE DELIMITATION OF THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF ARCHIPELAGOS
19-30 (U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf.13/18) (1957). For the recent claim of Indonesia, see N.Y.
Times, Jan. 18, 1958, p. 3, col. 1.
45. This was the burden of the United States response to the Indonesian claim. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 18, 1958, p. 3, col. 1. See also text of United States note to Ecuador concerning
the base lines around the Gaiapagos Islands, 4 FISHERIEs CAsE-PLEADINGs, ORAL ARGU-
MENTS, DOCUMENTS 603-04 (I.C.J. 1951).
46. Claims are summarized in FRANCOIS, SEcoN) REPORT ON REGIME OF THE Tmu'-
TORIAL SEA 11-17 (U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/61) (1953). For more recent claims, see
U.S. NAvAL WAR COLLEGE 445-48, 451-56.
47. Representative protest notes may be found in id. at 448, 461, 496-98. For a series of
protests by Great Britain and the United States to various claims to an extension of the
territorial sea, see 4 FISHERIES CASE-PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, DOCUMENTS
574-604 (I.C.J. 1951).
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or misunderstood by many observers. 48 The claimed authority in these adjacent
sea areas is far less comprehensive and more occasional than that asserted over
internal and territorial waters, since the claims are advanced chiefly for special,
limited purposes. Claims have been made for customs inspection, antismuggling
measures, conservation and exclusive exploitation of animal resources, exclusive
exploitation of mineral resources, defensive measures such as radar platforms,
defensive areas within which navigation is limited or temporarily excluded
and so forth.49 The areas over which these instances of authority are claimed
are also exceedingly diverse and variable in extent and have, in some instances,
been expressed in purely functional terms, such as the distance a ship or boat
can travel in an hour. The familiar opposing claim is in terms of freedom
from the asserted authority for purposes of navigation, fishing, mineral ex-
ploitation and so on.8 0
High Seas Areas Not Regarded as Contiguous to the Claintnt State
The final category of assertions of authority refers to high seas areas which
do not bear a close geographical relationship to the claimant state. The principal
claim respecting this area is to free and unimpeded navigation and fishing, a de-
mand widely shared among the community of states. States also advance claims,
however, to close off or use areas of the sea and the air above for naval
maneuvers, for testing nuclear weapons and for testing new developments in
missile systems.5 ' It appears, further, that states may make special claims
to authority concerning fishing grounds far from the home territorial base and
in areas contiguous to other states.5 2 For the most part, the exclusive authority
occasionally asserted over noncontiguous high seas areas is impelled by con-
siderations of increasing security against potential military violence. Opposing
claims are most emphatically grounded upon freedom of navigation and fishing
and allege that the exclusion of vessels from high seas areas, even for limited
times, goes far beyond any authorization of the law of the sea. 3
48. MASTERSON, JURIsDIcTION IN MARGINAL SEAS xiii-xiv (1929); 1 YEARBOOK 77.
49. See LAwS AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGimE OF THE HIGH SEAS (U.N. Doc. No.
St/LEG/SER.B/1) (1951) ; FRANcoIs, op. cit. supra note 46, at 11-24; U.S. NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE 403-501, 573-607; MASTERSON, op. cit. supra note 48; Boggs, supra note 4, at 192-
201.
50. See Netherlands protest to Iceland, 4 FISHERIES CASE-PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGU-
MENTs, DocuaMNTs 401-02 (I.C.J. 1951); United Kingdom protest to Yugoslavia, 4
id. at 575.
51. U.S. NAvAL WAR COLLEGE 573-628.
On Jan. 29, 1958, the United States Department of Defense announced that a new
missile range would be established on the Pacific coast. A New York Times report stated:
"Details of the new course were not divulged by officials. They said only that the center
would involve Pacific waters within a radius of 250 miles, extending north, south and
west from Point Mugu. Presumably special restrictions on shipping would be requirted,
especially when firings were taking place. The course would extend for more than 5000
miles westward across the Pacific." N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1958, p. 9, col. 3.
52. See statement of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in 1 YEARBOOK 91.
53. For collection of citations, see Margolis, supra note 25, at n.3. See also statement
of Indian delegate to Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 1 VERATig REcORD
226-34,
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The claims indicated above are those characteristically made by states against
each other when expectations of impending violence are relatively low. When
expectations of violence are high, or when violence is in process, the character
of claims made by states assumes an entirely different complexion, shifting from
claims to a minimum of exclusive authority to claims of complete exclusive
authority over whole oceans-in short, from claims permitting relatively wide-
spread inclusive use to claims by opposing belligerents to deny each other, and
nonbelligerents as well, any use or benefit of the sea.54 Within the scope
of this Article, no detailed survey of the complex range of claims made during
times of violence will be attempted, but, to emphasize the importance to states
of security claims, the observation is pertinent that coercion is exercised in
many different degrees of intensity and that the allegedly sharp dichotomy
between "peace" and "war" put forward by many observers finds no counter-
part in the world of reality. Closer observation reveals wide fluctuations in
degrees of intensity of coercion with only a constantly shifting line being drawn
between "war" and "peace" for varying legal consequences.
Methods
The methods by which these diverse claims are put forward embrace all
available instruments of policy, with primary emphasis on diplomatic com-
munication involving either unilateral or joint assertion of claim. Examination
of the process of claim indicates that most significant claims have been asserted
unilaterally rather than by explicit agreement following negotiations between
states . 5 The predominant role of the diplomatic instrument should not, how-
ever, obscure the fact that the other instruments of policy-the economic, mili-
tary and ideological-remain available for supporting claims to authority.
The military instrument is, of course, the major method for pressing claims
during times of violence, and even at other times, physical violence has been
used in exercise of asserted authority, as in some recent efforts to enforce
certain South American claims to an enlarged territorial sea. Similarly, the
economic instrument has occasionally been brandished, as in boycotts and re-
fusals to import foreign-caught fish. Finally, the ideological instrument has
been put to extensive use in seeking mass support for pressing or rebuffing
claims.
54. See, generally, CoLoMnos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 359-672 (3d rev. ed.
1954); TucKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA (1957). For a brief, seldom
mentioned, but brilliant exposition of this shift in claims and the relationship between
claims during times of "peace" and "war," see BROWN, THE FRamoM OF TIE SEAS (1919).
55. Fishing has been the activity of major significance about which agreements have
been successfully concluded. For a compilation of treaties concerning the high seas, see
LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS 137-295 (U.N. Doc. No.
St/LEG/SER.B/1) (1951). Later fishing treaties may be found in U.S. NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE 295-396. But as Gidel notes, international conventions are inadequate "as a means
of solving the problem of fishery conservation." GiDEL, MEMORANDUM 43. He adds that
"the system of conventions is at the mercy of individual egoism." Id. at 44.
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Conditions
The conditions under which claims are made include all the important factors
affecting the world power process and other world social processes. Among
the more general factors may be mentioned the structure of the world arena,
including: the number, location and relative strength of participants, with
special emphasis upon their spatial relation to the oceans of the world ;56 the
state of scientific and technological development of the means of communication,
transportation, production and destruction ;57 and the patterns and degrees of
interdependence of the peoples in the various territorially organized communi-
ties, in their institutional practices of production and destruction. 8
The factor most significantly affecting the claims which states make against
each other is, of course, the physical feature r9 that the oceans, unlike the land
masses, admit of common use 60 for a great variety of purposes 11 by many
different claimants without uneconomic interference with each other 02 and
are relatively indestructible by such use. Access to the oceans may be had
from one coast as well as from another; no great barriers obstruct communi-
cation and transportation from continent to continent; and where one ship has
just been, another can soon come. Even the marine life quickly and bountifully
replenishes itself, and, when due regard is had by appropriate conservation
measures for the natural conditions of such replenishment, a supply may be
56. Of course, the position of Great Britain and Japan as island powers situated off the
continents of Europe and Asia has had an enormous effect upon claims to the use of, and
authority over, the sea.
57. These factors alone account in large measure for the spate of recent demands
for the use of the ocean. See text at notes 5-14 supra.
58. See LASswELL, THE WORLD REVOLUTION OF OUR TrE (1951).
59. This feature might, if one prefers, be characterized as technological, rather than
physical, in that man's present instruments for the exploitation of the seas have not yet
developed to the point that competition and crowding are as great as on land.
60. The extent and significance of common use is graphically illustrated in the estimate
that ocean transportation accounts for more than three quarters of the total tonnage of
goods exchanged among nations. WOYTIsKY & WOYTINSKY, WORLD CoimmERE AND
GOVERNMENTs 429 (1955). This was, of course, one of the major bases of Grotius's
argument for freedom of the seas. GnoTrus, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 28-30 (Magoflin
transl. 1916).
61. Some of the purposes served by the oceans are briefly stated in Co=ER, THIs
GREAT AND WIDE SEA (rev. ed. 1949). The potentialities of future uses of the oceans appear
greater than the benefits thus far obtained. See SMNITH & CHAPIN, THE SUN, THE SEA
AND TomoRaow (1954); CARSON, THE SEA AROUND US 144-54 (1954).
62. Following Grotius's remarks about the impossibility of occupying the seas, Pro-
fessor Gidel has written: "The idea of freedom of the high seas has been built up on the
principle that the high seas constitute a space which does not and cannot come under the
juridical order of any particular State .... " GIDEL, MEMORANDUM 12. The important
point is not that the spaces of the high seas cannot be occupied or brought under the
sovereignty of a single state for, as has been proved much too often today, very obviously
they can; the point is rather that by proper accommodation the seas admit of economic
common occupation and use.
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maintained in some measure for all. 63 The experience of 150 years or more has
shown that the oceans of the world can thus be used concurrently by all for
the great common advantage and without undue injury to any.
Other especially significant factors include such varying characteristics of
the claimant states as their special configuration of coasts, relative population
growth and decline, military requirements, patterns of resource distribution,
consumption and production, capital assets and structure, distribution of scien-
tific and technical knowledge concerning the ocean and its resources, adjacent
waters and marine life and local customs and traditions of living.6 4
Still other factors requiring particular emphasis are those which most im-
mediately affect the expectations of participants in an arena about the possibili-
ties and probabilities of violence.65 Such expectations are a! function not only
of changing technology but also of the patterning and strength of potential
belligerents and peacemakers and of many other variables affecting the im-
mediacy and scope of violence expected. Even the claims which states make
against each other when expectations of violence are relatively low are thor-
oughly and continuously permeated by considerations of security, 66 and, as ex-
pectations of violence increase, the willingness of states to share the great com-
mon resource of the oceans rapidly recedes.
Effects
The effects achieved by claim and counterclaim extend to all the value
demands, inclusive and exclusive, advanced by participants. In terms of power,
inclusive access both to the oceans and to land areas expands or contracts as
63. See PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL CONFERENCE ON THE
CONSERVATION OF THE LIVING REsOuRCEs OF THE SEA passim (U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf.1O/7)
(1956).
64. The incidence of these factors upon claim is, of course, variable. Emphasis upon
special coastal configuration has been prominent in those claims to internal waters and
generally in drawing the base line from which the territorial sea is measured. Military
requirements have been stressed not only with respect to the breadth of the territorial
sea but in claims of authority over contiguous and noncontiguous areas of the high seas.
All of the other factors have been of varying importance with respect to all the claims to
exploitation and conservation of high seas fisheries. For example, the South American
claims to an extended territorial sea have all emphasized the special character of adjacent
Pacific waters and the allegedly unique importance of such waters to local economic
well-being; paucity of capital has been stressed by some states in urging conservation
measures which will preserve fisheries for future exploitation by underdeveloped countries.
The traditional importance of the sea as a source of food has been the basic influence in
Japanese resistance to claims of other states to conserve or exploit fisheries.
65. Recent claims to use of the high seas areas for testing purposes have been greatly
affected by these considerations; these expectations have also influenced recent claims to
internal waters (Peter the Great Bay) and claims of authority over contiguous sea
and air areas, as in the placing of radar platforms and the air defense identification zones.
66. Resistance to extensions of the territorial sea has long been greatly influenced by
military considerations. A Board of Trade Memorandum of October 18, 1864, to the
British Foreign Office candidly noted that the military disadvantage to Great Britain was
too great to permit extensions of the territorial sea. 2 SmITH, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE
LAW OF NATIONS 213-15 (1935).
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exclusive claims to authority are exercised. Similarly, distribution of wealth
among participants is variously affected as access for transportation and re-
source exploitation is inhibited or made freer. Wealth may be reduced or
enhanced, for example, as conservation schemes are developed and applied
successfully and unsuccessfully or as exclusionary measures take effect. Well-
being may be preserved or threatened as navigation and flight are endangered
or made more secure, and as animal and mineral resources are monopolized
or conserved or more ruthlessly and wastefully exploited. Enlightenment is
promoted or retarded as uses of the sea for communication and scientific
purposes is made more or less secure. Finally, the general security of all par-
ticipants and the individual security of most states are weakened or strengthened
as access to the seh for all purposes is progressively reduced or increased.
TE PROCESS OF DEcIsIoN
The process of decision, established by the world public order for the pur-
pose of resolving the claims which states make against each other, may be
conveniently and comprehensively described in terms of certain authoritative
decision-makers, seeking to promote certain common community objectives,
under all the vastly varying conditions of the world arena. To secure their ends,
the decision-makers employ certain methods or procedures in the prescription
and application of authoritative community policy, thus achieving effects on
the values of all participants including, in addition to claimant states, the
great variety of private groups and individuals whose activities are subjected
to regulation.
Decision-Makers
The decision-makers made authoritative by the perspectives of participants
in the world arena include not only the various officials of nation-states but also
the officials of international governmental organizations as well as judges of
international courts and of specially constituted arbitral tribunals. While each
of the latter institutions has found relatively frequent use in resolving disputes
about authority over the sea, most significant issues are decided by the officials
of nation-states who function, on other occasions, as claimants of authority.
The performance by state officials of this double function furnishes no justifi-
cation for the too common conclusion that there are no objective decision-
makers on issues concerning the law of the sea. Indeed, the very fact that
the state official is on some occasions an authoritative decision-maker for world
public order and on other occasions a claimant requires of the official the promise
of reciprocity in all his decisions and claims. From this necessary reciprocity
arise the recognition and clarification of a community interest which permits
an appropriate compromise of competing claims and affords sanction for de-
cision. In acting as an authorized decision-maker, the state official may accord-
ingly be just as objective, and just as much moved by perspectives widely
shared in the community of states, as a municipal decision-maker is objective
and moved by perspectives shared in the territorial community he represents.
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Objectives
The objectives sought by authorized decision-makers may be described at
different levels of abstraction. The most general objective may, perhaps, be
stated in terms of the promotion of the fullest, conserving, peaceful use of the
sea by all participants for achieving all their individual values in the greatest
measure possible. 6T In slightly lower abstraction, decision-makers seek this
goal through effecting a continually evolving compromise between exclusive and
inclusive claims.08 The particular kind of compromise which decision-makers
historically have regarded as serving their more general purpose is one which
restricts exclusive claims to the minimum reasonably necessary to secure the
special interests asserted and which promotes to the fullest degree possible in
all areas the more inclusive demands shared by the whole community of states.69
Underlying such broad objectives may be noted still another general objective,
sought by decision-makers in all international law: to promote stability in the
expectations of participants that power will not be exercised arbitrarily but
in certain patterns of uniformity, permitting participants to pursue their objec-
tives rationally, economically and effectively.
Methods
The methods invoked by decision-makers in resolving controversies embrace
all the various functions indispensable to the making and application of policy
-intelligence, recommending, invoking, prescribing, applying, appraising and
terminating. Since the present focus is primarily upon the prescription and
application of policy, consideration need not here be given to the other functions
mentioned. Note may be taken, however, that all participants, and not merely
the nation-state, play a role in the performance of these functions.
70
The most important, though least easily observed, mode of prescribing
authoritative policy for the resolution of controversies about the use of the
oceans is to be found in the day to day interactions of claim and tolerance, from
67. Cf. the formulation by Professor Gidel: "This concept of the common interest of
all States in the proper and rational use of the high seas must obviously underlie any
progress in regard to maritime law and furnish the guiding principle for its codification
and development." GIDEL, MEMORANDUM 10.
Professor Gidel's classic DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER (1932) offers the
richest and most authoritative documentation of this theme as well as of the law of the
sea generally.
68. For a similar statement of objectives, see declaration of Garcia-Amador, 1 VER-
BATIm RECORD 16.
69. For another formulation of this compromise in respect to a concrete problem, see
statement of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, 1 VERBATImI RECORD 238.
70. Participants include, for example, the Food and Agricultural Organization, the
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, General Fisheries Council for the
Mediterranean, and the Indo-Pacific Council, all of which are focused principally upon
intelligence and appraising. The International Law Commission plays a major role in
recommending prescriptions, and various regional bodies have also been important, such
as the Organization of American States.
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foreign office to foreign office, by which controversies are most frequently
resolved. Although a few signal successes have been achieved through prescrip-
tion by agreements, such as those about fisheries, very little has been accom-
plished on most significant issues by this method.71 The dynamic, multiple,
changing demands of states against one another for the use of the oceans have
for the most part successfully resisted collective efforts to subdue them
into the strait jackets of black-letter definition and rigid policy prescription.
Indeed, perhaps more notably in the law of the sea than in most areas of
international law, important prescription of policy has been effectively achieved
not so much through advance written formulations agreed upon by participants
as through the centuries-old slow development by claim and response of a
general consensus in community expectations. This consensus has been achieved
and maintained by a process of decision sufficiently flexible in procedure and
prescription, fortunately for the common interest, to permit the continuous
balancing and compromise of exclusive and inclusive interests and the general
resolution of claims to conflicting uses, in a way to give reasonable protection
to all interests in continuously changing contexts and under continually chang-
ing conditions. The process has observably been one of continual, creative
readaptation of inherited prescriptions, in the course of application to particular
controversies.
The application of policy to specific controversies about the use of the sea
may be performed by any of the officials described above, international or
national. Most important in both frequency of controversies and significance
of issues decided are the interactions among authoritative decision-makers
of nation-states in mutual tolerances, as well as in explicit agreements, ex-
pressed in decisions by foreign offices and national courts and legislatures.
Competing claimants, however, have often had recourse on some important
issues to international courts and to especially constituted arbitral tribunals.
The application of policy by these international decision-makers has had sig-
nificant effects on the process of decision concerning authority over the seas.7 2
The intellectual tools available to authoritative decision-makers for guidance
in deciding the specific controversies which come before them consist primarily
of the sets of complementary and highly flexible prescriptions, created and
transmitted through a long historic process. It is the complementary character
of this structure of prescription which requires the greatest emphasis, and this
character may clearly be seen in each of the categories of claimed exclusive
authority and opposing claims.
The claims by coastal states to a comprehensive, exclusive competence over
certain waters, most intimately connected with land masses, is commonly honored
71. GIDEL, MEMORANDU M 43, refers to inadequacy of prescription by agreement on
fisheries problems.
72. It is sufficient to recall the Fur Seal Arbitration, the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries
Case, the Lotus Case, the Corfif Channel Case and the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (U.N. Doc. No.
A/Conf.13/22) (1957).
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under the generic label "internal waters" and bolstered by certain supplementary
concepts in terms of "sovereignty," "independence," "territorial jurisdiction,"
"domestic jurisdiction" and equivalent symbols. 73 The major opposing claims
are given protection under such concepts as "right of access"-probably avail-
able only under express agreement-"right to trade, ' 74 "jurisdiction of flag-
state,"' 76 "sovereign immunity," 76 "right of entry" by "distress" 77 and so forth.
The only slightly less comprehensive and exclusive claim to authority over
certain adjacent waters immediately beyond the "internal waters" is similarly
honored under the label "territorial sea" and protected by the same concepts
as are applied to "internal waters," such as "sovereignty" and all its syno-
nyms.78 The opposing claim to a right of access, however, is here honored
wholly apart from agreement and is given a measure of protection under certain
circumstances s a "right of innocent passage" or a right to use an "inter-
national waterway."
79
The claim to demarcate boundaries to bring certain areas within "internal
waters" as distinguished from the "territorial sea" is upheld by a finding that
the particular configuration of coastal features and other "environmental fac-
tors" justifies the inclusion of water areas within a state's most comprehensive
authority, including the right to deny access.80 Supporting concepts invoked
73. 1 0PPENHEIm-LAUTERPACHT 502-03; HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 217, 253-56
(8th ed., Higgins 1924) ; CoLoMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 66-67, 128-29
(3d rev. ed. 1954); FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 313-14 (3d ed. 1948) ; 1 HYDE 726,
735; SMITH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 6 (2d ed. 1950).
74. The "rights" of "access" and "trade" are usually discussed under the label "right
of intercourse." Most commentators agree that no such right can be derived from past
practice. See 1 OPPENHEIm-LAuTERI'ACHT 321-22; 1 HYDE 581-82; HALL, op. cit. Supra
note 73, at 66-68; FENWICK, op. cit. supra note 73, at 268. But see CoLoiInos, op. cit. supra
note 73, at 129.
75. This claim also rests mostly on agreement, and a large number of agreements
have been concluded. For a summary of practice, see JEssuP 144-94. See also Comment, Does
the Eighteenth Amendment Violate International Law?, 33 YALE L.J. 72 (1923).
76. Riesenfeld, Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Vessels in Anglo-American Law: The
Evolution of a Legal Doctrine, 25 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1940). More recent trends are
discussed in Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28
Bar. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 250-72 (1951). See also Brandon, Sovereign Immunity of Govern-
ment-Owned Corporation~s and Ships, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 425 (1954).
77. JEssuP 194-208.
78. CRocxER, THE EXTENT OF THE MARGINAL SEA (1919), collects the views of numer-
ous publicists on this and other problems. See FINAL Acr FOR THE CODIFICATION OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 15 (League of Nations Doc. No. C.228.M.115.1930.V); JEssuP 115-19;
HALL, op. cit. supra note 73, at 190-92 (speaks of "property rights") ; FENWICK, op. cit.
supra note 73, at 376-77; 1 OPPENEIm-LAUTERPACHT 487; CoLomBos, op. cit. supra note
73, at 68-70; HARVARD REsEARcH 288-89; SMITH, op. cit. supra note 73, at 6-7; 1 HACK-
WORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 677 (1940) (statement of Lord Curzon).
79. JESSUP 119-44; 1 OPPENnEim-LAUTERPACHT 493-95; COLOMBOS, Op. cit. supra
note 73, at 98-100; HALL, op. cit. supra note 73, at 197-99; 1 HYDE 515-19; HARVARD RE-
SEARCH 295-99; 1 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 78, at 645-51; BUSTAMANTE, THE
TERRoIrAL SEA 113-17 (1930).
80. The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case and the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,
two of the most celebrated decisions in international law, contain pronouncements on this
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by decision-makers include "bay," 81 "historic bay,"8 2 "harbors,"8 3 "straight
line in general direction of coast"8 4 and so on. The opposing claim that in-
ternal waters should not include such areas is accepted when the decision-maker
finds that the particular configuration of the coast and other factors are not
sufficient justification for a claim to the most comprehensive authority. Support
is added by such labels as "low water mark,"8 5 "following sinuosities of the
coast"8 6 and "10-mile closing line,"'8 7 as well as by all the general doctrines
subsumed under the label of "freedom of the seas."88
Concerning the breadth of the territorial sea, a relatively large but apparently
decreasing number of decision-makers have in recent decades insisted that
customary international law requires a narrow belt of three miles and urged in
support of this alleged requirement the explicit policy of securing and main-
taining the greatest possible extent of internationalization of the oceans of the
world. 9 Doctrinal justification invokes, at its highest level of abstraction, the
"freedom of the seas" and all its subsidiary formulations, such as freedom of
navigation, fishing, flight and so on. 0 The opposing claims, asserting various
more extensive widths, have on occasion gained acquiescence upon historic
claim, and both make explicit reference to a variety of factors justifying inclusion of areas
within internal waters. See SCOTT, HAGUE COURT REPORTS 141, 183-84 (1916); Fisheries
Case, Judgment of Dec. 18, 1951, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116, 133. See also DE VISSCHER,
THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 214-17 (Corbett transl. 1957).
81. North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case, ScoTT, HAGUE COURT REPORTS 141, 183-85,
187-88 (1916); 1 OPPENHEIm-LAUTERPACHT 504-10; COLOMEOS, op. Cit. supra note 73, at
131-43; CROCKER, op. cit. supra note 78,'passim. 1 HYDE 468-82; HARVARD RESEARCH 265-74.
82. Fisheries Case, Judgment of Dec. 18, 1951, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116, 130-31; Gulf
of Fonseca Case, 11 Am. J. INT'L L. 674-730 (1917) ; CROCKER, op. cit. supra note 78,
passirn; 1 HYDE 468-69.
83. COLOaiBOS, op. cit. supra note 73, at 128-29. BASES OF DISCUSSION 45-47, 61-63,
evidences the general consensus of governments on this point. CROCKER, op. cit. supra
note 78, passim.
84. Fisheries Case, Judgment of Dec. 18, 1951, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116.
85. Ibid. See Waldock, The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
114 (1951) ; COLOaIBOS, op. cit. supra note 73, at 85-86; HARVARD RESEARCH 265-67.
86. This phrase is often considered as equivalent to the "low-water mark" concept. See
Fisheries Case, Judgment of Dec. 18, 1951, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116, 129; COLOMBos, op. cit.
supra note 73, at 85. However, the low-water mark may also be utilized where the base
line departs from the mainland coast.
87. Fisheries Case, supra note 86, at 131; 1 OPPENHEIm-LAUTERPACHT 507; CRocKE,
op. cit. supra note 78, passim.; HARVARD RESEARCH 265-74.
88. See FISHERIES CASE-PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, DOCUMENTS 58 (I.C.J.
1951). The protest of the United States to Indonesia about the vast extensions of its
internal waters was apparently formulated principally in general terms of freedom of
the seas. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1958, p. 3, col. 1. See also Waldock, supra note 85, at 171.
89. 1 HYDE 452-53; replies of governments in International Law Commission, Report,
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REc., 10th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 33-34, 43, 46 (Doc.
No. A/2934) (1955).
90. Supporting arguments in the statements in note 89 supra, contain reference to
these doctrines. See also COLOMsBOS, op. cit. supra note 73, at 82-83; HARVARD RESEARCH
251; U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 448-51.
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grounds 01 or upon the ground that the high concentration of coastal interests in
adjacent waters requires a broader extent of sovereignty and a consequent
diminishment of inclusive right. These broader claims are also occasionally
supported by reference to an alleged sovereign right of unilateral determination
of the marginal belt 92 and to a series of variously determined compromises
between coastal needs and community interest.93 Doctrinal justification is,
again, urged in terms of "sovereignty," "independence," "jurisdiction" and
similar symbols.
The claims which states commonly make to particular and occasional ex-
ercises of authority, for the protection of many special interests, in contiguous
areas beyond the territorial sea are protected under a great variety of labels
such as "contiguous zone," "customs area,". "defensive areas," "continental
shelf," "conservation zone" and so forth. 94 States are accorded a competence to
declare special zones of many different widths upon the ground that the ex-
ercise of such competence is necessary to the protection of exclusive interests
and does not unreasonably interfere with more inclusive interests.9 5 The oppos-
ing claim is sometimes accepted by some decision-makers upon the ground
that the competence of the coastal state is largely, if not completely, exhausted
by the regimes of internal waters and territorial sea and that the competence
of the coastal state is restricted to very few and narrowly delimited zones for
91. Fisheries Case, Judgment of Dec. 18, 1951, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116, 120; Waldock,
supra note 85, at 126.
92. This has been the chief argument underlying the CEP claims and is the view of
the Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Bulgaria and others. See
statements by these representatives in VERBATIm Rzcon.
Such arguments, of course, completely misconstrue the process by which customary
practice establishes authority. It is not the unilateral claim but general acceptance by other
states which adds the element of authority. See note 102 infra.
Authoritative rejection of this concept of unilateral competence was made by the
International Court of Justice in the Fisheries Case, supra note 91, at 132: "The delimitation
of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the
will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that the
act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is com-
petent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other States depends
upon international law."
93. Replies of Iceland and Sweden in REPORT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Com-IssION,
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. Rac., 10th Sess., Supp. No. 9 (Doc. No. A/2934) (1955).
See also commentary in REPORT 12.
94. 1 OPPENHEIm-LAUTERPACHT 497-501, 628-35; 1 HYDE 758-60, 777-85, 789-94;
GIDEL, MEmORANDum 26-36; MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN MARGINAL. SEAS xiii-xv (1929) ;
McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Meamsres for
Security, 64 YARE L.J. 648, 666-81 (1955) ; Gidel, La Mer Territoriale et la Zone Contigia,
48 HAGUE RECUEIL 137 (1934).
The extent of claim and tolerance may also be seen in the collections of national legis-
lation cited note 4 supra.
95. JESSUP 95; GIDEL, MEMORANDUM 28; SMITH, THE LAw AND CUSTOM OF THE
SEA 20 (2d ed. 1950) ; McDougal & Schlei, supra note 94, at 667. This fundamental point
appears to have been the basic theme of Garcia-Amador's outstanding contribution to the
debate in the Sixth Committee. 1 VzBAT M REcoRD 14-24.
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limited purposes,"6 even excluding security purposes, according to the Inter-
national Law Commission.9 7 These claims are supported by invoking "freedom
of the sea" and all equivalent formulations in highly absolutistic terms.03
With reference to the outer expanses of the oceans, the basic demand of
states for freedom of navigation and fishing is now, as in the past, honored by
authoritative decision-makers through application of the doctrine of "freedom
of the seas," still more hallowed than precise.99 The opposing claims, those
which interfere in greater or lesser degree with peaceful navigation and fishing,
are accepted and protected not only in terms of the same broad doctrine honoring
inclusive use but also in other terms directed more at the short-term interests
of the claimant state, such as "self-defense," "hot pursuit," "danger areas" and
so on.'
00
The most important points to note about these inherited intellectual tools
which decision-makers employ in the resolution of particular controversies are
that they make reference more to the responses of the decision-makers-to the
decisions actually taken-than to the factors and policies affecting that response,
and that, because of their complementary and flexible character, they do not so
much prescribe certain definite future responses as pose for decision-makers
a variety of alternatives. The factors and policies which in fact significantly
affect response and guide a decision-maker in his choice of alternatives are
indicated only most imprecisely and incompletely. It is true that with respect
to a few issues, such as that of access by nonnationals to what are called
"internal waters," there is such a consensus about factors and policies among
decision-makers that certain rather definite patterns of past decision may with
some confidence be projected into the near future. Yet even the factual reference
of "internal waters" remains in some measure undetermined. And when the
issue moves beyond such waters to controversies about other areas or concen-
trations of interest, decisions become most obviously a function of the balancing
of many different factors and policies and a compromise of competing interests.
96. The most notable contemporary illustration of this attitude is the view adopted
by the International Law Commission. See text at notes 145-46 infra. See also Jassur 241
for the protests by the British government against American assertions of authority
beyond the three-mile limit for tpurposes of enforcing antiliquor laws. For apparent
relaxation of traditional British objection to contiguous zones, see British reply in Inter-
national Law Commission, Report, U.N. GENERAL ASsEmBLY OFF. REc., 10th Sess., Supp.
No. 9, at 40 (Doc. No. A/2934) (1955). But see the statement of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,
in this instance also representing the view of the British government, that the coastal state
has no "jurisdiction" over the contiguous zone and that its laws and regulations do not
apply to the zone. 1 YwAmRooK 50. The attitude of most of the commission members was
similarly restrictive.
97. REPORT 39.
98. See, generally, JEssup 241-76.
99. 1 OPPENHEIm-LAUTERPACHT 589-617; CoLomBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
SEA 39-65 (3d rev. ed. 1954) ; 1 HYDE 751-63; GIDEL, MEMORANDUM 1-5.
100. See SmrTH, op. cit. supra note 95, at 54-56; 1 HYDE 763, 794; COLOMBOS, op. cit.
supra note 99, at 123-28; Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual
.,iates in International Law, 81 HAGUE RECUEIL 455, 464-66 (1952).
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The actual task which confronts a decision-maker in a particular controversy
is, accordingly, not that of automatically applying inherited prescriptions but of
giving such prescriptions a new operational meaning by weighing all the differ-
ent factors and policies which are significant in the context before him. The
range of factors, mentioned briefly above as characteristics of particular oppos-
ing claims, which are potentially significant in any particular context, is of
course extensive and various. It includes such items as the interests sought to
be protected by the claims, the relative location and extent of the ocean area
affected, the extent of authority or immunity claimed, the activities subjected
to authority or affected by it, the degree and duration of interference with ex-
isting uses, the historical factors involved such as custom and priority in usage,
the relationship between the authority or immunity claimed and the interests
sought to be protected, and the significance of all the interests affected, ex-
clusive or inclusive, to all the participants, including the whole community
as well as the claimants. The weight to be given any one or more of these
factors must vary as particular contexts vary, since the significance of any
particular factors depends upon the presence or absence of other factors and
the peculiar configuration of all factors in context. With all the assistance that
inherited prescription can offer in pointing to significant factors and policies
and in anticipating recurring types of contexts, a decision-maker must in the
end make his own appraisal of the total context and his own choice in priority
among the competing interests. For all types of controversies, the one test in
guiding final choice that has been available in the past to decision-makers,
whatever the degree of consciousness or explicitness in invocation, has been
"that simple and ubiquitous, but indispensable, standard of what, considering all
relevant policies and all variables in context, is reasonable as between the
parties."'' 1 Indeed, it is in the measure that decision-makers have been con-
scious of this necessity of weighing and balancing all factors in context to de-
termine which of opposed claims are most reasonable by the criteria of com-
munity policy that decisions have been rational and reasoned rather than
arbitrary and dogmatic.
102
101. McDougal & Schlei, supra note 94, at 660; see JEssup 95; SMITH, op. cit. supra
note 95, at 20.
102. Because of certain contemporary misconceptions, it may be emphasized that this
formulation does not mean that each state may itself unilaterally decide what is reasonable
with respect to its exclusive claims and lawfully impose its decision upon the community.
It is not the unilateral claim, but the acceptance by other states, even when manifested in
reciprocal tolerances, which creates the expectations of uniformity and "rightness" in
decision which we commonly call international law. The determination of what is reason-
able in a particular controversy requires, accordingly, both (1) an authoritative decision-
maker (in customary international law, the general community of states) and (2) decision
by community criteria. It is only by a weighing and balancing of relevant factors by
authorized decision-makers in terms of community criteria that reasonableness, if the
word is to be given its historic and common meaning, can be determined.
Another factor that the states claiming a competence to the unilateral determination
of the lawfulness of their claims ignore is that in the making of such claims they are
attempting to determine not only their own interests but also the interests of other states.
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Conditions
The conditions under which authoritative decision-makers prescribe and
apply policy to claims to authority include all those previously outlined in the
process of claim, but certain factors bear more immediately upon prescription
and application than upon claim. In broadest statement, prescription and appli-
cation reflect the structure and more general process of power relationships
in the world arena. Thus, a high degree of internationalization of the oceans
was first achieved in a multipolar arena in which no state had the effective
power to chase all other states off the oceans.' 0 3 Internationalization was de-
veloped and strengthened in an era when major maritime powers conceived
internationalization to be in their own long-term interests and, in addition
to ordinary reciprocity and retaliation, utilized their fleets as a sanction.
In particular, during the important formative years of the 18th and 19th
centuries, the pre-eminent policy of freeing the oceans of claimed exclusive
authority received primary support from Great Britain, the major naval power
during most of that period. This support was, in turn, derived from the char-
acteristics of naval power both as a flexible instrument for projecting
British policy to distant parts of the globe and as an instrument of marked
economy of force in application, enabling a relatively small, strategically located
island territory to wield an extraordinary influence in shaping world events.
This structure of the world arena and the distinctive characteristics of sea
power played leading roles in developing the structure of prescriptions avail-
able to present-day decision-makers, and to the extent that the arena remains
multipolar and sea power retains these characteristics of flexibility and economy
in use, they will continue to be significant factors affecting decision.
Today, however, not only does no centralized agency exist for prescribing
and applying policy, but no single state or group of states has the effective
power necessary to enforce policy without wholly uneconomic violence. The
continued maintenance of a common policy recognizing and protecting in-
clusive interests in the oceans of the world must, accordingly, depend upon the
continued maintenance of a general consensus among participants on what
such policy should be. The experience of recent decades has certainly demon-
strated that the states of the world have a community interest in accommodating
and protecting in measure both the exclusive and inclusive claims asserted by
states. It remains, nonetheless, an indispensable condition to the effective pre-
By extending their own exclusive claims, they invade the historic inclusive rights of other
states. By undeniable reciprocity, these other states may in turn claim a competence
unilaterally to determine the extent of their interests. Thus, the end of claimed unilateral
competence can only be irresolvable conflict. Multilateral concurrence, whether by custo-
mary consensus or by explicit undertaking, is indispensable to accommodation.
The general point is made specific by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice when he states that
"the plea of sovereignty cannot of itself give a country any right to appropriate waters
which are not, according to law, its territorial waters any more than the plea of sovereignty
can give a country a right to territory which is not already its territory. .. ." 2 VERBATIM
RFcoR 538; see I id. at 296.
103. See note 2 .upra.
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scription and application of a common policy that the states continue to recognize
their community of interest and the conditions under which a consensus can
be maintained to preserve such common interest. Excessive claims by some
states for exclusive control which interferes with reasonable use by others and
violates long-established expectations about lawfulness may confidently be ex-
pected to lead to more extensive claims by others, with the ultimate disinte-
gration of common authority and immeasurable loss in the particular values
of all claimants.
Effects
The effects achieved by decision-makers in compromising and accommodating
the great variety of claims to authority correspond in greater or lesser degree
with the objectives they seek. Most vitally, as affecting all participants, the
internationalization of the oceans for all purposes decreases or increases as
decision-makers respond to the multiple exclusive and inclusive demands of
claimants, honoring and protecting the one or the other in greater measure.
More concretely, the fuller peaceful, rational use of the oceans is promoted
or retarded as decision-makers are more or less successful in perceiving and
weighing adequately all the variables which are in fact relevant to the most
economic accommodation of conflicting demands.
A complete appraisal of the process of decision in broadest community per-
spectives would, of course, require a more systematic and detailed clarification
of the global policies at stake in both the inclusive and exclusive claims of
states, a careful survey of past trends in decision on the various types of specific
controversies and of the many different factors affecting such decision in
different contexts, calculation of the probable impact of this past experience
upon future developments, and assessment of past trends and future probabili-
ties in terms of clarified policies and possible alternatives.10 4 All this Article
will attempt is some further clarification of the community interest in the con-
tinued maintenance of the highest possible degree in internationalization of the
oceans, a more comprehensive itemization of the factors which authoritative
decision-makers have in the past taken into account in achieving a workable
balance between inclusive and exclusive claims, and certain suggestions of what
a rationally conceived community interest under probable future conditions
may require in the way of general solutions of the various types of specific
controversies presently under debate.
THE COMiON INTEREST IN AN EcoNomIc BALANCE OF EXCLUSIVE
AND INCLUSIVE USES
The common interest of all states in both exclusive and inclusive uses of
the oceans of the world and in an economic accommodation of all uses is not
104. For a more comprehensive statement of the necessary intellectual tasks, see
McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 HAGUE
RECUEIL 137 (1953) ; McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value
Clarification as an Instrument of Denocratic World Order, 61 YA.x L.J. 915 (1952).
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difficult to demonstrate. If the several centuries of experience of territorially
organized communities is to be trusted, it is reasonably clear that all states which
border upon the oceans have a special interest in those traditional exclusive
assertions of control in nearby areas which permit a state both to protect its
territorial base and organized social life from too easy invasion or attack from
the sea and to take advantage of any unique proximity it may have to the
riches of the sea bed and marine life. It is no less clear that each state, whether
coastal or not, has an interest in the fullest possible access, either for itself
or for others on its behalf, to all the inclusive uses of the ocean, such as navi-
gation, fishing, cable-laying and so on, for the richest possible production of
values. From this mutual interest of all states in all types of uses, it follows
that each state has an interest in an accommodation of such uses when they
confliot, as inevitably they must, which will yield both an adequate protection
to exclusive claims and yet the greatest possible access to inclusive uses. The
net total of inclusive uses available for sharing among all states is directly
dependent, further, upon the restriction of exclusive claims to the minimum
reasonably necessary to the protection of special claimants. If all states
asserted and were protected in extravagant, disproportionate, exclusive claims,
there would be little, if any, net total of inclusive use for common enjoyment.
The ancient fable of a group of monkeys on one end of a seesaw is relevant:
a single monkey may be able to race to the other end and pluck grapes from
vines on an overhanging tree, but if all the monkeys suddenly race, no monkey
gets any grapes. From the perspective of the whole community of states, it
may be added that the encouragement of appropriately conserving inclusive
uses, which bring to bear the efforts and resources of many different states,
is more productive of values than the encouragement of exclusive uses not
reasonably necessary to the protection of a particular state. For states tightly
locked in a global arena in an irrevocable interdependence with respect to all
values, and highly dependent upon specialization among themselves for the
production of many values, the conclusion would seem inescapable: the common
interest is in an accommodation of exclusive and inclusive claim which will
produce the largest total output of community values at the least cost. 105
The continued community interest in maintenance of the highest possible
internationalization of the oceans may perhaps be most clearly demonstrated,
in the absence of supervening conditions requiring a monopolization of power
in common interest, by reference to the achievements of past internationali-
105. In this formulation, we postulate as a community goal the greatest production and
widest possible sharing of values among all peoples. This is the goal to which we subscribe
and which we recommend. We do not believe it necessary to engage in an endlessly
regressive justification of this postulate by logical derivations from other premises. This
goal is in fact widely shared in the world today, and experience suggests that people who
prefer very different justifications-from religion, science, history, common sense, cultural
faiths and so on--can co-operate effectively in giving it operational meaning in terms of
particular allocation of competence. The burden might be put, we suggest, upon one
who rejects this goal to state his own postulate and justification of it acceptable to the
general community.
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zation. The oceans, which admit of economic sharing, have manifestly been
made to serve the peoples of the world as a great common resource, actually
being shared for the mutual benefit of all in the greater production of all values.
Both the inclusive interests of all states and the special exclusive interests of
coastal states have been successfully accommodated through the historic, in-
herited public order of the oceans. A brief recapitulation may serve as a
reminder of the full significance of the achievement.
In terms of power, exclusive control of the oceans by one or a few states
for national aggrandizement has been largely precluded, and the oceans have
been maintained as great natural buffer zones, reducing the confrontation
of the states and insulating power rivalries. Power over events upon the
oceans has in fact been shared by all states to an extraordinary degree even
without recourse to a centralized institutional mechanism for decision-making.
By appropriate accommodation and compromise, a public order of the seas has
been maintained to permit states to send their argosies to all the four comers
of the world and to take adequate account of both the general security interest
of the community of the states and the special security interest of particular
states. States have also been afforded competence, without excessive inter-
ference with productive activities on the sea, to protect their police, fiscal
and other special interests through reasonable measures of authority. It is
suggestive of the striking achievement of the public order of the sea in reconcil-
ing disputed claims to power that it has furnished a model for balancing ex-
clusive and inclusive claims which some have recommended for transfer to
potential controversies over the activities in outer space.10
The historic process of decision has similarly achieved a very wide sharing
in the allocation of resources and in access to the oceans and markets of the
world. Though coastal states have been given a reasonable measure of pro-
tection in control of immediately adjacent activities and resources, the larger
expanses of the oceans have been mostly preserved as accessible to all with only
a relatively miniscule portion of the total area allocated for exclusive exploita-
tion. States have been enabled to take advantage of the opportunities of
transport, trade and communication afforded by access to the oceans, and, by
the application of certain common standards, the riches of the ocean have been
in large measure shared.
106. See Craig, National Sovereignty at High Altitudes, 24 J. AIR L. & Com. 384
(1957); Cooper, The Russian Satellite-Legal and Political Problems, 24 J. AIR L. &
Com. 379 (1957) ; McDougal, Artificial Satellites: A Modest Proposal, 51 Am. J. INT'L
L. 74 (1957); Jenks, International Law and Activities in Space, 5 INe'L & CoMP.
L.Q. 99 (1956) ; Cooper, Legal Problems of Upper Space, 1956 PRoc. Am. Soc'Y IN 'L
LAw 854; Schachter, Who Owns the Universe?, Colliers, March 22, 1952, p. 36.
In an article published October 17, 1957, in Sovetskaya Rossiya, a Russian newspaper,
Dr. G. Zadorozhny stated: "By analogy with the principle of the freedom of the open sea
which, beyond the limits of territorial waters and special sea zones, belongs to nobody
and is at the general disposal of all nations, the upper atmosphere, lying outside the bounds
of effective air control by states, may also be considered an open sky zone and for the use of
all nations."
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Enlightenment has also been conspicuously served on a global scale by
maintaining the oceans as open channels of communication and thus promoting
the free circulation of peoples and ideas. Cable-laying has been of such import
that it has been given a special protection in practically all authoritative formu-
lations of the doctrine of freedom of the seas.
Well-being, as well as wealth, has been enhanced in substantial measure
through preservation of the oceans as a common storehouse of riches. By
according some degree of special competence to coastal states, the public order
of the oceans has given protection to peoples particularly dependent upon
the sea for food and livelihood. Coastal states have also been accorded authority
to pursue measures for protection of health, such as sanitation and quarantine
controls.
Skill has been promoted, and specialization encouraged in high degree,
through securing free access to all for the productive utilization of the ocean
and its resources. Rich and varied outlets have thus been provided for develop-
ing individual potential both through manifold methods of exploiting the
oceans and through movement of the peoples to other, more promising areas
of the globe.
Respect has been enhanced in the sense that states have been enabled, with-
out discrimination as to flag, to have unimpeded access to the oceans for pur-
suing all their reasonable value demands, inclusive and exclusive. Equality
of states has had its richest exemplification in the fact that all states, irrespective
of relative wealth and power position, have been largely free to utilize the
oceans, each restrained only by the limitation of particular environmental
conditions.
Solidarity and expanding loyalties have been furthered as the oceans have
been made to function not as barriers between peoples, such as mountains, but
as easily available links of communication and transportation fostering a cos-
mopolitan sense of identification between peoples of otherwise distant and
foreign lands.
Contributions to rectitude are manifest in the law of the sea itself: the inter-
actions of the states upon the oceans have afforded a great laboratory for the
testing of procedures in the formulation and application of common standards
of right and in the accommodation of varying standards from many different
cultures.
FACTORS INFLUENCING AUTHORITATIVE DECISION-MAKERS
All this great net advantage in community values has been achieved, it may
now be emphasized in further detail, by a very distinctive process of decision,
a process in which conflicting claims to authority and use have been deliber-
ately balanced, by a consideration of relevant factors in specific contexts under
community perspectives, for the explicit promotion of the fullest, conserving,
peaceful use of the seas by all.107 Such economic accommodation in com-
107. The broad outlines of the following history are documented in McDougal & Schlei,
supra note 94.
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munity interest has been sought by authoritative decision-makers both by a
heavy weighting of the balance, save in the areas most immediately adjacent
to states, in favor of inclusive rather than exclusive uses and by the mainte-
nance for the resolution of conflicts between inclusive claims, in areas beyond
those conceded to exclusive authority, of a completely flexible, open-ended
balance, permitting account to be taken of all the nuances of specific contexts
and the continuous admission of new uses. Even the historic crystallization
of authoritative expectations in favor of the relatively comprehensive, exclusive
authority of a state over waters immediately adjacent to its shores may be
viewed as but a continuous community weighting of the factor of propinquity
or contiguity: states, as territorially organized communities, are permitted to
include such immediately adjacent waters within their permanent bases of
power, over which they may assert comprehensive and continuous authority,
because without such authority they could not protect the security of their
value processes upon their land masses. It is, however, when conflicts move
out beyond such immediately adjacent waters and the importance of exclusivity
declines as that of inclusivity increases, that the process of balancing many
different variable factors in context becomes the most necessary and most
explicit: the public order of the oceans then protects a state only in such
occasional assertions of authority and use as are determined to be reasonable
under the criteria of common interest in relation to the competing, similar
claims of other states.'0
8
To determine what is reasonable in any particular context of conflicting uses,
an authoritative decision-maker must, of course, make reference to the whole
congeries of factors relevant in that context-and contexts vary greatly. The
factors relevant to decision are many and varied, and the significance of any
particular factor in any particular controversy depends upon the total configu-
ration of factors and its place in that configuration. Fortunately, the com-
plementary and highly ambiguous character of inherited, authoritative doctrine
has made it possible for a decision-maker to take all these variables into account
and to achieve in particular controversies an appropriate relation of factors to
context. The great range of possibly relevant factors may perhaps be best
indicated by a rough grouping into three broad categories: the claim to author-
it , asserted; the counterclaim on behalf of a use interfered with by such exer-
cise of authority; and the modality and degree of interference involved. 109
Under each heading, an itemization of the type of relevant factors may be offered.
108. For most explicit application of this test, see Fisheries Case, Judgment of Dec.
18, 1951, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116; North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case, SCOTT, HAGUE
CoutT REPORTS 141 (1916).
109. It may be hoped that a detailed itemization of the factors which authoritative
decision-makers observably take into account will do much to dispel the misconception,
so pervasive in contemporary discussions of the law of the sea, that "economic," "socio-
logical" and "political" considerations are not "legal" considerations and that there is an
unbridgeable gap between legal and other considerations. If all that is meant by the
limited notion of what legal considerations include is that past practice has established
certain crystallized expectations about what factors a decision-maker is authorized to
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The Claim to Authority Asserted
1. The scope of authority claimed in terms of the range of events sought
to be subjected to authority, the range of events actually subjected to authority,
the extent and location of the area subject to claim with particular reference
to the relationship to the claimant state and the duration of the claim.
2. The interest sought to be protected by the claim to authority in terms of
the objective sought, such as security, power, wealth, well-being and so forth.
3. The relationship, in terms of appropriateness, between the authority claimed
and interest sought to be protected. Inquiry here has been directed at the ex-
tensiveness of the claim, in all its facets, as compared or contrasted with the
significance of the interest to be protected.
4. The significance to the claimant state of the interest at stake with reference
to the following specific considerations :110
a. Demographic factors.
b. Economic structure, particularly the degree of dependence upon
sea resources or use of the sea.
c. Resource consumption and needs-sources of food, industrial
development and requirements.
d. Technological developments in fishery techniques and mineral
exploitation.
e. Scientific knowledge-geology, oceanography, mineralogy, biology
and so forth.
f. Living customs and traditions.
g. Historical patterns of claimed authority and usage.
h. Military position and requirements.
The Counterclaim
1. The type of activity or activities with which claim to authority might or does
interfere.
2. The intensity of occurrence of such activity in terms of the number of par-
ticipants, the frequency of occurrence and the likely future pattern.
take into account, it may do no harm. If, however, what is meant by the notion is that
these crystallized expectations do not point to economic, sociological and political factors
and that a decision-maker is not authorized to apply inherited formulations by reference to
such contemporary factors in the context before him, then it may be suicidal illusion. The
rules of the law of the sea, like other legal rules, exhaust their effective power when they
guide a decision-maker to relevant factors and indicate presumptive weightings. Even
the most definitive of past crystallizations, those about competence over internal waters
and territorial sea, are but commonly accepted weightings of the economic, sociological
and political importance to coastal states of propinquity, and on occasion even these are
made to yield to other factors and other weightings.
110. The weight which some of these factors may have in influencing decision is
graphically illustrated in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case, ScoTT, HArUE COURT
REPORTs 141 (1916), with respect to bays and in the Fisheries Case, Judgment of Dec. 18,
1951, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116, with respect to internal waters and the territorial sea.
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3. The significance of such activity to states affected in terms of the variables
mentioned above.
4. The extent and location of the area in which activity occurs, if different
from the area over which authority is claimed.
5. The burden of avoiding interference.
6. The suitability of existing use to the area concerned.
Modality and Degree of Interference
The primary reference here has been to the types of competing uses, in
particular to whether the claim to authority involves:
1. A conflicting use, such as navigation or fishing, which may nevertheless
be accommodated with other uses.
2. A conflicting use which is incompatible with some, but not all, other uses.
Thus, claims to exploitation of oil in the continental shelf exclude others
from use for that special purpose but do not necessarily exclude use by others
for other purposes, such as navigation.
3. A conflicting use which, while it endures, is incompatible with all other
uses, such as the use of the sea for testing nuclear weapons.
4. A claim to limit the uses, such as measures for conserving living resources
of the sea.
5. A claim to prescribe the conditions of use, such as antipollution measures
and other prescriptions governing passage through the territorial sea.
An additional consideration is the duration of interference resulting from
the claim to authority, which may range from momentary through temporary
to permanent assertions of authority."1
THE COMMUNITY INTEREST UNDER PROBABLE FUTURE CONDITIONS
The final task is to examine briefly each of the six major types of controversy
arising in the process of claim, for the purpose of attempting to clarify, by an
appropriate application of community perspectives and a general weighting of
relevant factors, what a rationally conceived community interest may, under
probable future conditions, require in the way of general solutions. Certain
degrees of crystallization in past expectations about appropriate standards for
such controversies will be noted. Reference will also be made to certain recent
recommendations, most especially those by the International Law Commission,
which tend to reverse the traditional weighting in favor of inclusive uses by
uneconomic concession to exclusive uses. Finally, a few suggestions will be
offered in support of a continued accommodation of conflicting claims by a
balancing best designed to achieve the maximum advantage in community
111. Less systematic presentation of these factors may be found in Boggs, National
Claims in Adjacent Seas, 41 GEoGRAPHicAL REv. 185 (1951) ; GiEL, MEMORANDUM passima.
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values. Although the most serious issues in policy relate to the last four types
of controversies, each will be considered.
Authority Over Internal Waters
That a state has all the competence over its internal waters that it has over
land areas within its boundaries has long been accepted."12 If the waters
designated as internal are not unduly extended, one need not quarrel with this
policy; such comprehensive control in immediately adjacent areas is indispens-
able for the protection and promotion of reasonable interests of a coastal state.
If the community purpose in including certain areas within internal waters
is, as we suggest, to enable a state to exercise the comprehensive control neces-
sary to protect access to its territorial base, the one major recommendation of
the International Law Commission concerning internal waters cannot but
appear mystifying. Apparently in view of its proposed vast extension of areas
which might be included within the internal waters of a state, the Commission
recommended the recognition and accordance of a right of innocent passage
through some of the water areas so designated, those which prior to inclusion
within internal waters had normally been used for international navigation."'
Acceptance of such a recommendation would, of course, require that such areas
be regarded for all practical purposes as identical in legal status with the
territorial sea, since the major difference between the two areas lies in the
general recognition of a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea
but not through internal waters.""4 The result of the Commission's suggestion
is, among other things, to create a considerable doubt whether the newly
created "internal waters" fulfill any special function sufficient to justify their
establishment, a doubt considerably intensified by the Commission's failure to
set forth any explanatory factors. 15
Authority Over the Territorial Sea
The proposals presently being made about the scope of state authority over
waters agreed to be within the "territorial sea" exhibit no drastic changes from
the practice of recent decades, which achieved a workable balance between
exclusive and inclusive claim. In certain respects, however, the recommenda-
tions of the International Law Commission concerning the right of innocent
passage are more confusing than enlightening. One proposal, for instance,
suggests that the right of innocent passage should extend to passage for
purposes of entry into internal waters." 6 Elsewhere, however, the Commission
112. See note 73 supra.
113. REPORT art. 5, at 3, 14.
114. This point was also suggested by Finland in the Sixth Committee debates. See
1 VERBATIn RECORD 78.
115. Readers of the commission draft will find that doubt intensified by the absence,
at any place in the draft, of any mention of the purpose served by internal waters, leaving
the further impression that the Commission had no clear notion on this point either.
116. REPORT art. 15(2), at 19.
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has inserted a provision explicitly recognizing the competence of the coastal
state to impose conditions upon the admission of ships to internal waters, an
authority so broadly stated that little appears left of the supposed right of
innocent passage.117 In any event, the formalistic character of the proposed
right would seem apparent in the universal recognition, surprisingly not men-
tioned by the Commission, that a coastal state has sufficient authority over entry
of persons and resources into its territory to deprive any supposed right of
entry of any practical consequence." 8 In the absence of consideration of much
more basic policies involving exclusive state control over imports and exports,
immigration, and temporary entry of aliens, a provision on a right of innocent
passage to internal waters can hardly be meaningful.
In still another respect, the International Law Commission might have attained
a somewhat higher degree of clarity in its prescriptions about innocent passage.
The article dealing with the meaning of this concept provides that "passage is
innocent so long as a ship does not use the territorial sea for committing any
acts prejudicial to the security of the coastal state or contrary to the present
rules, or to other rules of international law." 9 Neither the "present rules"
nor "other rules of international law" are given any concrete reference in the
ensuing articles on innocent passage; hence security is the only specific interest
a vessel is forbidden to prejudice on pain of losing a right of passage. The
range of possibly prejudicial activities left undetermined by these vague criteria
was even acknowledged by commission members in their deliberations when
they agreed 120 to the necessity of making explicit mention in the commentary
that ships entering the territorial sea "for the purpose of smuggling or with
the intent to avoid import or export controls of the coastal state could not be
regarded as being on innocent passage.' 121 If it was a matter of doubt in the
minds of commission members, as it clearly was, whether even these widely
acknowledged legitimate interests were to be within the competence accorded
by the Commission to coastal states in the territorial sea, future decision-
makers could hardly be expected to find clear guidance in the commission
formulations. A far more realistic and enlightening course would have been
to make an explicit admission that the authority accorded a coastal state in the
territorial sea is, and must be, very comprehensive indeed, extending even
to a substantial measure of discretion in determining the innocent character of
a particular passage, with only the ordinary sanctions of reciprocity and re-
taliation available to assufe reasonable exercise of discretion. Instead of at-
tempting the impossible task of confining state authority within the supposedly
restrictive confines of illusory categories, the International Law Commission
117. Id. art. 17(2).
118. "It is believed that the proposition is unquestionable that under international
law every nation may prohibit the introduction into its territory of any commodity which
it sees fit to exclude." Jzssup 219; see 1 OPPExHEim-L oTERPACHT 323.
119. REP RT art. 15(3), at 19.
120. 1 YAR.oox 200-01.
121. Ibid.
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might have achieved much more significant clarification by a presentation of
the more important factors or conditions to be taken into account in weighing
the coastal interest in restriction of or interference with passage and the com-
munity interest in freedom from such restriction or interference. It might have
emphasized, for instance, the relationship of the coastal state with its neighbors
and other states, the importance of the waters to international transportation
and communications, the interest supposedly threatened and the possible al-
ternative methods of achieving protection.
Boundary "Between Internal Waters and Territorial Sea
In drawing the lines enclosing internal waters and thus providing baselifies
for measuring the width of the territorial sea, the traditional prescriptions
about following the sinuosities of the coast and about the length of the line
enclosing bays have weighted decision in favor of the utmost practical limitation
of the extent of internal waters. As may be observed in several sections of its
draft, the International Law Commission seems to be reversing this traditional
preference. Thus, in attempting to generalize the decision in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case, the Commission has sanctioned the use in certain
circumstances of straight base lines drawn in the general direction of the coast
and joining certain points of the general coastal configuration in a way to
include relatively extensive areas within internal waters. 22 Elsewhere, the
Commission recommends, without reference to supporting conditions, that the
waters of a bay, enclosed by the shores of a single state, to the landward of a
fifteen-mile closing line be included within internal waters.1 23 Finally, in a
cryptic provision omitting any mention of conditions or consequences, the
Commission recommends that drying rocks and shoals within the territorial
sea be used as "points of departure for measuring the extension of the territorial
sea."' 24 Concerning all these recommendations, one may reasonably recall
that the traditional prescriptions greatly limiting internal waters appear to have
served the interest of the community of states well and suggest that very weighty
new factors should be required to justify such wide departures from past prac-
tice. Reference to such factors is not only absent from the Commission's draft,
but the stipulation of a right of innocent passage through some of the new areas
of internal waters seems to suggest that these extensions of internal waters were
recommended without reference to any factors at all. 125
122. REPORT art. 5, at 4.
123. Id. art. 7, at 5. The representative of Finland put this issue sharply before the
Sixth Committee: "Why invite States to appropriate the maximum, regardless apparently
of any other considerations ?" 1 VERBATI. REcoRD 79.
124. REPORT art. 11, at 5.
125. The Commission understandably was influenced by the decision in the Fisheries
Case, yet observers might have some reason to doubt that the decision was properly under-
stood or, if understood, approved. If the factors justifying inclusion of certain Norwegian
waters within internal waters were regarded by the Commission as capable of generalization
to apply to water areas near other states, as apparently was the case, the Commission
nevertheless seems to have ignored such factors in approving a right of innocent passage
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Breadth of the Territorial Sea
Despite all the argument about the three-mile limit, until relatively recent
times the consensus was clear that states were authorized to claim only a very
narrow belt for the comprehensive competence honored under "territorial sea."
The states with the largest coasts and with the preponderance of vessels in
tonnage asserted and were willing to tolerate a width of no more than three
miles. The exceptional claims to a broader belt were also relatively modest, such
as the Scandinavian claims to a four-mile width 126 and others, chiefly Mediter-
ranean, to six, with an occasional claim being made to twelve.
1 27
The recommendations of the International Law Commission, which amount
to an invitation to a full reconsideration of the policy of a narrow belt in this
time of resurgent national egoism, may make it very difficult to establish any
wide measure of agreement upon the modest belt necessary to the reasonable
protection of the special interests of the coastal state. In suggesting that ex-
tension of the marginal belt to twelve miles would not constitute a breach of
international law,128 the Commission appears in effect to invite extensions to
that limit, since the import of the proposal is either that a twelve-mile belt is in
accord with international law or that international law does not presently make
provision on this point other than to deny validity to claims to an extent
greater than twelve miles. 12 9 In one further particular, the International Law
Commission has recommended what is, in substance, an extension of the ter-
ritorial sea. As noted earlier, the Commission proposes potentially vast ex-
tensions of internal waters, the effect of which, by projecting the base line
outward, is to extend the outer limit of the territorial sea into waters which
would otherwise have been part of the high sea. 30 The expansive effect of the
Commission's recommendations is further emphasized in the provision for a
through certain internal waters, thereby assimilating them to the territorial sea. To this
extent, the provisions of article five depart from the decision in the Fisheries Case and
attach a different meaning to the factors thought by the court to support that decision.
126. The Scandinavian claim to a four-mile width resulted merely from a different
method of measuring a marine league and was not intrinsically a claim to a width broader
than three miles. MEYER, THE EXTENT OF JURISDIcTION IN COASTAL WATERS 517 (1937) ;
see Kent, The Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit, 48 Am. J. INT'IL L. 537 (1954) ;
Walker, Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule, 22 BaIT. Y.B. INT'IL L. 210 (1945).
127. Professor Spiropoulos declared before the Sixth Committee that Greece extended
its territorial sea merely because its neighbors had done so, leading to speculation that
perhaps much of the current demand for extension stems from a desire to keep up with
neighbors. See 1 VERBATIM REcoRD 58. See also Boggs, supra note 111.
128. REPORT 12-13 (commentary to art. 3).
129. Some states have already interpreted the Commission's actions as sanctioning a
twelve-mile limit. In explaining the recent extension of the Venezuelan territorial sea to
twelve miles, the representative of that country stated that the Venezuelan Congress was
"interpreting the concept expressed by the International Law Commission itself in its
recent reports ... ." 1 VERBATIM REcoRD 291. Both Professor Francois and Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice denied that the Commission conceded any validity to the twelve-mile limit.
1 id. at 9-10, 236.
130. See note 122 supra.
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fifteen-mile closing line for coastal indentations from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is to be measured.
1 31
Careful calculation of relevant factors suggests that world community policy
should continue to be heavily weighted in terms of accepting only a very narrow
width of waters as territorial sea. Perhaps the most significant factor to be
considered in determining an appropriate balance between exclusive and in-
clusive claim is the relationship between the interest which the coastal state is
seeking to protect and the scope of authority normally incident to the territorial
sea.1 2 The real impetus behind most of the demands for a broader territorial
sea appears to derive from a demand to monopolize the exploitation of fish
or to obtain revenue by requiring payment for exploitation by nonnationals.
3
Certainly, this interest is most explicitly stated in the modem demands for
extension of the territorial sea, and indeed it overshadows all other particular
interests that might be advanced to justify the extension. In attempting to
secure a special interest in exclusive exploitation of the animal and mineral
resources of the marginal belt, coastal states may thus be seen to demand
extension of a regime of the most comprehensive authority over wide adjacent
sea areas. The extravagance of this claim becomes manifest when the broad
comprehensiveness of such authority is recalled in more detail as including:
1. Exclusive 'ights of exploitation and control over animal and mineral
resources of the marginal belt.
2. The competence to exclude passage through the marginal belt by qualify-
ing the character of the passage sought or by suspending any passage at all.
This competence is widely acknowledged to be most extensive in the case of
warships, however inoffensive the projected passage may be. And it includes
competence to exclude all passage by aircraft.
3. Authority to subject navigation in the belt to the regulation of the
coastal state.
4. An indeterminate competence over events and persons aboard passing
vessels.
131. See note 123 supra.
132. The more detailed inquiry for determining this relationship was set forth in
text following note 109 supra.
133. The representatives of Peru, Ecuador and Costa Rica, whose claims have been
widely regarded as attempts to extend the territorial sea to 200 miles, asserted before the
Sixth Committee that such claims were merely to an extension of sovereignty only for
the purpose of conservation. 1 VERBATIm REcoRD 32, 157; 2 id. at 473. These averments
were accompanied, however, by claims of unilateral competence to determine the breadth
of the territorial sea. An accompanying, totally inconsistent argument was made that a
"territorial sea" of 200 miles in the Pacific constituted only 3% of the width of that ocean
whereas the territorial seas claimed by Great Britain and France extended to 20% of
the English Channel. 1 id. at 158.
Professor Francois has declared that the International Law Commission was convinced
that claims to a broad territorial sea stemmed from a desire for conservation rather than
exclusive fishing. 1 id. at 8. The ambiguities and contradictions noted above do much to
create doubt whether the Commission's sanguine belief is warranted.
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5. An equally indeterminate competence over the vessel itself for the purpose
of judging claims against it.
6. A competence commensurate with the obligation to maintain safety of
navigation in the belt.
7. Authority to protect against pollution from passing ships.
8. Authority to prescribe and apply regulations concerning security, customs
and health.
9. Authority to control belligerent use of neutral waters, a control that might
be onerous and even embarrassing to the claimant during times of violence.'
34
The potential impact upon inclusive, community uses in the proposed expansion
of all these aspects of comprehensive authority to vast new areas may be high-
lighted by reference to the comment of one member of the Commission that
an extension of the territorial sea to twelve miles "would result in most of the
maritime highways of the world falling within territorial waters."'' 3 5
An additional consequence of widening the marginal belt may be noted in
the increase of internal waters, caused by the meeting of territorial seas extend-
ing from different coasts of the same state. The effect of this meeting is to
close off ever larger areas, the transformed territorial seas, as internal waters
over which the authority of the coastal state is even more comprehensive in
the sense both that no passage or entry need be permitted and that once entry
is conceded, the application of coastal authority is almost purely discretionary,
extending to any control the local authority may want to exercise, with but
minor exceptions relating to the immunity of warships. 3 6 Moreover, as larger
areas are enclosed within internal waters, the territorial sea is, in turn, extended
even further out upon the high sea-a result following almost in geometrical
progression. All this increase in coastal authority, in terms both of range of
events and geographical area, 3 7 is being claimed despite the fact that practically
none of it is necessary to aclieve the actual interest sought to be secured by the
coastal state.
Thus, if, from the perspective of the historic balancing of interests, one applies
the test requiring that the assertion of authority be reasonably proportionate
to the interest sought to be protected and that account be taken of the degree
of interference with community uses, many of the recent demands for extension
134. These various attributes of authority in the territorial sea appear to have been
overlooked by Professor Baxter in his suggestion "that the contiguous zone and sweeping
claims regarding the width of the territorial sea are interchangeable devices for achieving
the same result." Baxter, The Territorial Sea, 1956 Pnoc. Am. Soc'v INT'L L. 116, 122.
The same may be said for numerous others who equate the contiguous zone with the
territorial sea.
135. Faris Bey el-Khouri, in 1 YEARBoOK 213; see GmEL, MEmORAPDUm 41-42.
136. See text at note 73 supra; JEssup 144-94.
137. Widening the territorial sea affects passage by aircraft. The New Zealand repre-
sentative in the Sixth Committee noted that extension of the territorial sea may have more
severe consequences for air navigation than for that on water since there is no right of
innocent passage in airspace. 2 VERATm REcoRD 330.
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of the territorial sea in order to secure a monopoly of fisheries should clearly
be rejected as unreasonable encroachments on the public domain, without any
justification in the special needs of the claimant. In other contexts, furthermore,
where the claims of exclusive exploitation appear reasonable by community
criteria because of certain special factors such as the degree to which the claim-
ant's economy is dependent upon the exploitation of adjacent fisheries or the
extent to which a claim to a special interest is buttressed by historic practice,
a much more economical legal device, in the recognition of new contiguous
zones, is available for taking such interests into account.
138
Whatever the true origin of the narrow belt of territorial sea, the function
which today justifies the territorial sea is that of permitting a state to exercise
certain important controls over access to and from its shores. Under con-
temporary conditions, only a narrow belt supplemented by certain occasional
exercises of authority in contiguous zones is necessary for this purpose. When
the conception of security is expanded beyond control of access to include
defense against military attack, the contemporary technology of destruction
makes all widths largely obsolete.139 As in the case of fisheries, where a
coastal state can show that a particular width of control is on occasion peculiarly
necessary to its defense, the recognition of a special contiguous zone for its
security would serve its purpose, without the permanent imposition upon other
states of all the disadvantages of an extended territorial sea. Thus, whatever
the particular interests motivating claims to extension by individual states, the
necessary measures for securing such interests hardly require community recog-
nition in the claimant state of all the exclusive authority customarily associated
with the territorial sea. To deny broad, inclusive community uses in certain
areas by honoring the exercise by a coastal state of the most comprehensive
authority imaginable merely to secure a single, narrow interest, whatever its
special significance to the claimant state, is comparable to cutting off a healthy
arm in order to heal a pimple on the tip of a finger.
140
138. Canada has already formally suggested recognition of a twelve-mile contiguous
zone for exclusive fishing. 1 id. at 298. Mr. Padilla-Nervo made an analogous recom-
mendation during commission deliberations, asking for explicit recognition of a contiguous
zone for conservation and noting the fundamental identity of the contiguous zone concept
and the Commission's recommendations concerning conservation of the living resources
of the sea. 1 YEARBooK 77. As noted earlier, this general idea was most cogently expressed
by Mr. Garcia-Amador in the Sixth Committee in his emphasis on the availability of more
limited concepts enabling a state to secure its special interests without extending the
territorial sea. 1 VERBATIm RECORD 21-23.
139. This point was made most forcefully by Judge Pal, during commission discussion,
in his observation that the advance of science had made security "meaningless" as one of
the considerations determining the breadth of the territorial sea. 1 YEAROOK 169. Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice offered the same opinion before the Sixth Committee. 1 VERBATIM
RxcoRD 238-39.
140. See the remarks of Mr. Escudero, of Ecuador: "The alleged equality of all
States with respect to their right of access to the high sea and their right to exploit its
resources is somewhat illusory, because only the great maritime and shipping Powers
exercise this right on a really large scale. Thus the exercise of the right depends on
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Authority Over High Seas Areas Contiguous to the Claimant State
When the concept of the contiguous zone is observed descriptively, it may
be seen to be a technical term which authoritative decision-makers invoke to
honor many various occasional and particular exercises of authority by coastal
states beyond the territorial sea.141 Despite the powerful opposition of Great
Britain 142 and the reluctance of influential writers to admit the facts of past
practices in reciprocal claim and tolerance, 43 recent decades have shown a very
wide claim to and acceptance of this concept. Examples of authority claimed,
and widely accepted, over contiguous areas are many and diverse. The more
prominent instances include authority for purposes of security, enforcement
of customs regulations, fiscal laws, antismuggling measures, safety of navigation,
exploitation of mineral and animal resources, conservation of fisheries and naval
maneuvers.1 44 Easily the most spectacular, and indicative of the great flexi-
bility of the concepts of contiguous zones, are the claims to the continental shelf
now advanced by numerous states and accepted by most others. The real
economic power and this equality before the law loses all reality in the face of the economic
inequality of States. Consequently, it is indispensable that coastal States with scanty
physical resources should have the right to extend their territorial sea in order to safe-
guard their economies. This has the effect of a compensatory measure to correct an
injustice." 1 id. at 155.
The fact that a country has not had the industrial development itself to take fullest
advantage of inclusive uses does not mean that others have not engaged in inclusive uses
to its benefit. In an interdependent world, all states are dependent upon a global net
production of inclusive values.
141. The historic function of the concept of contiguous zones as a term of art
for economic escape from the rigidities of the territorial sea is indicated in Gidel's definition:
"The notion of the high seas zone contiguous to the marginal sea is a technical legal
notion aimed at justifying special powers exercised by the littoral State on the high
seas beyond the limit of the marginal sea." GDmEL, MEm~ORANDUm 28. It will be noted
that both "contiguous" and "zone" lose much of their reference to geographic factors
and take on a reference to legal consequences-the consequences that certain exclusive
claims are lawful. This function of the concept, and of other concepts, clearly eludes
the members of the International Law Commission when they seriously debate whether
recognition of a "contiguous zone" removes ocean areas from the "high seas." 1 YEAR-
soox 80.
More important, the manifold service which the concept today performs was, apparently,
never recognized by the Commission. Thus, in a cryptic discussion of conservation zones,
"Mr. Pal observed that the term 'contiguous zone' should be confined to its technical
sense and should not be used in any other." 1 YEARnooic 82. The grave question is
whether a "technical sense" which is not even accurately descriptive of past or present
practice can be arbitrarily projected into the future to straitjacket the demands of coastal
states which do not unreasonably interfere with inclusive interests. Remarks by Judge
Pal elsewhere make it clear that the full contemporary scope of contiguous zones, accepted
by the general community of states, was never really considered by the Commission.
I id. at 77.
142. See note 96 supra.
143. See 1 OPPENHEim-LAUTERPACHT 495-99; COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
THE SEA 82-84 (3d rev. ed. 1954).
144. See note 94 supra.
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function of the contiguous zone concept has been to serve as a safety valve from
the rigidities of the territorial sea, permitting the satisfaction of particular
demands through exercise of limited authority which does not endanger the
whole gamut of community interests.
The greatest inadequacies of the International Law Commission draft are,
unfortunately, to be found in its recommendations about this very flexible and
serviceable concept of the contiguous zone. Under the explicit label "contiguous
zone" only one section is offered, and this section could scarcely confound
confusion more. 145 Reference is made to one contiguous zone, not to the many
actually existing in practice, and that one zone is limited to twelve miles,
without regard to differences in factors affecting the multiple demands of coastal
states. Perhaps the most explicit evidence of the Commission's narrow view
lies in the restricted range of interests which it suggests a state ought to be
authorized to protect in contiguous areas: "customs, fiscal or sanitary regula-
tions." The most surprising of the omissions, one explicitly mentioned in
the commentary as deliberate, is that of security, surely the most serious con-
cern of every state.'
46
In other sections, provision is made for exclusive exploitation by the coastal
state of the mineral resources of the continental shelf,147 without any apparent
recognition of the fact that this is but another example of the occasional exercise
of authority, not precluding traditional inclusive uses, beyond the territorial
sea in the manner commonly protected under the label "contiguous zone"
with, of course, various special factors adding justification to its acceptance.
Similarly, the sections on high seas fisheries provide for authority which
is tantamount to recognition of a contiguous zone with a certain limited,
unilateral competence in coastal states. Such states are authorized to adopt
conservation measures to prevent undue exploitation of fisheries, whether by
national or nonnational fishing vessels.
148
In the sections on the continental shelf and on conservation of fisheries, the
International Law Commission recognizes the true function of the contiguous
zone and attempts appropriate balancing of exclusive and inclusive interests. 14
The insight here achieved might well, however, have been generalized both
to permit other contemporary interests to be taken into account and to preserve
a flexible device for the accommodation of continuously emerging interests.
The rigid conceptualism in fact adopted by the Commission, introducing
a wholly artificial distinction between the contiguous zone, on the one hand,
and the continental shelf and conservation zones on the other, denies the fluidity
of the general concept and affords opportunity for irrational attempts to fore-
145. REPoRT art. 66.
146. Id. at 39-40 (commentary to art. 66).
147. Id. arts. 67-73.
148. Id. arts. 49-59. The Commission rejected the suggestion that these articles and
that on the contiguous zone should be explicitly linked. See id. at 33; 1 YEARBooK 77.
149. The whole course of discussion in the Commission clearly reveals that individual
members were aware of this process. See, particularly, 1 YEARBOOK 90 (1ff 26-30), 180
(ff 64). See also 1 VERBAim REcoRw 11, 16, 21.
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close future claims to newly developed uses of the sea.'50 The dynamic nature
of technological progress and state demands are completely inconsistent with
such a restricted view. In future collisions between the two, the former may
confidently be expected to prevail. For future maintenance of economic balance
between exclusive and inclusive claim, the general concept of contiguous zones
must be preserved in all its fluidity with respect to both purposes and widths.15'
The interest in security demonstrates, as clearly as any interest, this need
for fluidity. In the present decentralized structure of the world arena, each
state has an overriding interest in protecting itself from military attack. Hence,
the interest in security is common to all states, however unique it may appear
in particular instances. Furthermore, even in the age of satellites and missiles,
perhaps even more urgently in such an age, states, in order to preserve their
security, must continue to make occasional, limited assertions of authority,
as by establishing radar stations or enforcing requirements of identification, in
areas beyond the bounds of the territorial sea.1 2 The continuing danger to
150. Not all members of the Commission shared the view that the contiguous zone
was a severely restricted concept. 1 YEARIooK 74 (ff 55, Hsu), 76-77 (111 8-13, Padilla-
Nervo).
151. Mr. Jelic, Yugoslavia, spoke with deep wisdom when he stated that "only if
the security and interests of the coastal State in the contiguous zone are guaranteed will
it be possible to check the trend towards the enlargement of the territorial sea and so to
work out a compromise on the breadth of the territorial sea." 1 VERBATIm RECORD 145.
For appropriate emphasis upon the importance of continuous adaptation, see Lauterpacht,
Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. IN FL L. 376 (1950).
152. Admittedly, even the comprehensive control of whole oceans, much less the occa-
sional exercise of limited authority in narrow zones, will not today assure states of an absolute
security. But, that the recognition of a competence to declare contiguous zones for
security purposes may serve no general interest does not follow. If one were to carry the
freedom of the seas argument to its limit, opposing major powers could ring each other's
shores with missile-launching platforms or ships. Surely, no one would deny that the
coastal state possesses the necessary authority to prohibit this.
Even in the age of supersonic aircraft and missiles, the United States and Canada
have found it necessary to establish air identification zones off their respective coasts.
The potentialities of submarine-launched missiles may yet inspire special sea zones related
to protection against this threat. The establishment of radar platforms in contiguous high
seas areas constitutes a claim to authority not dissimilar to that involved in establishing
installations for mineral exploitation of the continental shelf. For some facts on this
point with reference to exploitation of the continental shelf, see MouroN, THE BREAlDr
OF THE SAFETY ZONE FOR INSTALLATIONS NEcEssARy FOR THE EXPLORATION AND EXPLOI-
TATION OF THE NATURAL REsouRCES OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/26)
(1958).
Illustration of contiguous zones for security purposes in the missile age is indeed as
accessible as the front page of the daily newspaper. It has recently come to light that
France has declared a thirty-two-mile wide contiguous zone for security off the coast
of Algeria which no nation protested until Yugoslavia did so after seizure of a Yugoslav
vessel carrying arms to Casablanca. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1958, p. 1, col. 3.
For protection against the more traditional weapons, still the only weapons at the
disposal of most of the states of the world, security zones of limited extent quite obviously
have lost none of their historic relevance.
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coasts from more conventional weapons is concisely stated or understated,
even by that most articulate opponent of all contiguous zones, Sir Gerald Fitz-
maurice, who argues that "under modem conditions.., warships could bombard
a coast with the utmost accuracy from a distance of 40 miles or more, and air-
craft carriers could operate from a distance of 200 or 250 miles or more."'l' 3
In the calculable future, states will hardly regard their security interests,
that is, their interests in protecting all their values from attack and possible
destruction, as of any less vital importance to them than their particular eco-
nomic and other interests. The problem of reconciling such exclusive security
interests with the more general inclusive interests of other states must accord-
ingly remain, and the device of the contiguous zone, which can be fashioned
precisely to fit the particular and perhaps even temporary security needs of
claimant states, would once again appear to afford the most economic mode
of effecting accommodation. For this reason, continued recognition of a special
competence in each state to declare reasonable contiguous zones would appear
merely as another expression of broad community interest.1 4 And what is so
153. 1 YEABOOK 215. The argument by Sir Gerald that no contiguous zone for
security is needed since all states have a "right of self-defence" even upon the high seas
is self-defeating. It recognizes the vital interest of states in security but remits them for
protection to a concept which is subjected by some commentators to a most restrictive
interpretation. The severe limits that might be imposed upon the concept of self-
defense are indicated in the recent article by Professor Gidel, Explosions Nuclcaires
Experimentales et Libert6 de la Haute Mer, in FOUNDAMENTAL [Sic] PROBLEMS OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: FEsTscHRIFT FUR JEAN SPIROPOULOS 191 (1957).
Of course, an alternative, more expansive interpretation of "self-defence" is possible.
For a collection of the authorities, see McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests
in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648, 684-87 (1955). General
acceptance of a sufficiently expansive concept of "self-defence" could indeed make contro-
versy academic since it is of little consequence to states whether their vital interests are
protected under the label "contiguous zones" or under that of "self-defence."
154. The degree to which the International Law Commission, in omitting security
as a permissible purpose for contiguous zones, rejects past and contemporary practice is
readily apparent from even a casual glance at the following authorities:
1. LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS (U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/
SER.B/1) (1951). In this collection of national legislation on contiguous zones, security
is second only to customs in frequency of mention.
2'. The Harvard Research onl Territorial Waters declares that necessary measures on
adjacent high seas for a state's immediate protection are "entirely reasonable" and a part
of "the long established practice of many states." HARVARD RESEARCH 334.
3. GIDEL, MEMORANDUM 28-36, cites many precedents for recognition of a contiguous zone
for security. In summarizing his doubts about the lawfulness of a claim as extensive
as that in the Declaration of Panama, Professor Gidel concludes that contiguous zones
for security only appear "admissible in limited areas, for limited periods and up to
limited distances from the points which appear to require protection." Id. at 36. This
statement is accompanied, however, by one difficult to reconcile: "It does not seem that
the contiguous zone for security interests can be considered as a principle of international
law which a littoral State can invoke, beyond its territorial waters, in respect of foreign
governments without their consent." Id. at 31-32.
4. The International Law Commission has itself recognized the exclusive competence of
the coastal state over exploitation of the mineral resources of the continental shelf. It
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demonstrably economic, in the area of security, could by appropriate detail be
shown to be similarly economic, if in varying measure, in regard to other
problems as well.
High Seas Areas Not Contiguous to the Clainant State 155
In past practice, the freedom of the seas has meant that each state was free
to use the oceans in accommodation with other uses, not that each state was
given a license to engage in any activity, irrespective of effects upon the interests
of others. By the judicious management of the complementary sets of flexible
concepts previously discussed, authoritative decision-makers have accommodated
many different types of uses, not only those of transportation and fishing.
Unfortunately, the International Law Commission has accepted and em-
bodied in its draft certain absolutistic conceptions of the freedom of the seas
wholly at variance with both past experience and sound future policy. The
most general black-letter provision, article twenty-seven, could hardly offer
less guidance to particular decision. It states merely that no state may subject
any part of the high seas to its sovereignty and that freedom of the seas includes,
among other things, freedom of navigation, fishing, and flight and freedom to
lay submarine cables and pipelines. 156 The commentary to this article not only
fails to add any guiding principles for the resolution of particular conflicts
but even leavens the initial formulation with a further measure of confusion.
Thus, it is said that "no State may subject any part of the high seas to its
sovereignty; hence no State may exercise jurisdiction over any such stretch
of water,"'1 7 although the non sequitur in the leap from absence of sovereignty
should therefore be recalled that one of the primary justifications for the unilateral pro-
nouncement of the United States about the continental shelf, which triggered the abundance
of claims subsequently made, was that of "self-protection" which compelled the "coastal
state to keep close watch over activities off its shores which are of the nature necessary
for utilization of these resources." Probably no one would deny that this expectation was
prominent in the subsequent continental shelf claims and was a chief consideration under-
lying the Commission's recommendation of exclusive competence in the coastal state.
5. Even in the very early years of the nineteenth century, Chief Justice Marshall, in a
case still regarded as pre-eminent authority as to the lawfulness of contiguous zones, recog-
nized it as a "universally acknowledged" principle that a state's "power to secure itself
from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory." Church v.
Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234 (1804).
155. The degree to which circularity in reference to legal consequences sought to be
justified pervades even this apparent geographical reference may be seen in Professor
Hyde's definition of "high seas." "The term 'high seas,' " he writes, "may be said to refer,
in international law, to those waters which are outside of the exclusive control of any
State or group of States, and hence not regarded as belonging to the territory of any of
them." 1 HYDE 751. When the issue is whether certain waters or certain activities are
or are not under the control of a state, such a definition is hardly helpful. The same
circularity obviously infects the concept of "freedom of the seas," when it is paired off
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to absence of jurisdiction could hardly be more obvious. 158 Continuing from
such unpersuasive derivation, the Commission further muddies the waters of
authority by declaring that "States are bound to refrain from any acts which
might adversely affect the use of the high seas by nationals of other states," 159
a statement which, at most, begs the question completely. The Commission
then proceeds to list,160 under the euphemistic label of "regulation" of the free-
dom of the seas, certain instances of authority conceded to states, despite the
literal prohibitions in other portions of the commentary, which if exercised
could very well adversely affect use of the high seas by nonnationals. 1 1 This
itemization of the competence of coastal states-called rules recognized in
"positive" international law-appears to be the end product of an unrevealed
balancing process, in which some interests were weighted more heavily than
others and given priority over freedoms of use previously recited. The itemi-
zation offered is, however, characterized by the Commission as "regulation"
of the freedom of the seas which does not "limit or restrict the freedom of the
seas," a consequence which is even disproved by the Commission itself, in
158. Much of this confusion appears to derive from a failure to distinguish between
claims to all that comprehensive and continuous competence which is summed up as "sov-
ereignty" and claims to exercise only the occasional and limited competence over certain
particular events which is commonly called "jurisdiction." The fact that world public
order denies "sovereignty" over certain ocean areas to any single state does not mean
that it denies to states competence to apply their authority to certain particular events,
such as the activities of vessels and aircraft whether national or foreign. Conversely,
the fact that states are authorized to exercise some such authority upon the high seas
over navigation, fishing, flying, cable-laying and so on, does not mean that they are
authorized to exercise such authority at all times and all places, under all conditions, with-
out any interference from similar uses by others and without regard for the consequences
of their ocean uses upon others. The competence conferred upon states by "freedom of
the seas" is not an absolute competence, but a relative, shared competence which can survive
only if it is exercised in accommodation with the similar competence of others. Cf. MOUTON,
THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 185 (1952); Houston, Freedom of the Seas: The Present
State of International Law, 42 A.B.A.J. 235 (1956).
It may be suggested that in its formulation the Commission was making a distinction
between jurisdiction over "waters as such" and jurisdiction "over ships or activities on
or under water." In terms of semantic reference, the two modes of expression would
appear, however, to point to precisely the same particular competence. Power is just as
sweet, or bitter, by one name as another.
Particularizing the consequences of such confusion, Mr. Pathak, of India, in his coin-
ments upon the nuclear tests, entirely fails to distinguish claims to sovereignty and claims
to occasional jurisdiction and assumes an absolutistic conception of the freedom of the
seas. 1 VE BATim RECORD 230.
159. REPORT 24.
160. Ibid.
161. Professor Francois correctly points out that certain activities, "though they
might adversely affect other States, might be justifiable" and hence, that the concept of
"reasonableness" must be introduced. 1 YEARBOOK 33. The dream of absolute uses that
do not interfere with each other or require accommodation is, of course, just as much
a delusion as is the notion that the "freedom of the seas" is an absolute which can be
defined -without taking into account certain complementary concepts and the policios they
express.
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including provisions for compulsory arbitration of disputes over fishery conser-
vation and for submission of differences regarding the continental shelf to the
International Court of Justice. 16 2 Although the measures of unilateral compe-
tence recommended by the Commission would most certainly limit or restrict
the extent of freedom of use, it was apparently impelled to incorporate a denial
of that effect in order to be consistent with the previous declaration that "no
State may exercise jurisdiction over the high seas," a statement with little claim
either to accuracy in description or to safe prediction or to desirability in
preference.
All this confusion in recommendation and tergiversation in expression may
thus be traced to the initial adoption of an absolutistic doctrine of freedom of
the seas which explicitly denies the necessity of achieving an appropriate weigh-
ing and balance of competing claims to authority, and, in any particular case,
of honoring the use judged more reasonable in the particular context.'6 One
grave consequence of this type of conceptualism, in addition to obscuring the
relativity of all uses and interests, may be to add to the danger of the conceptual-
ism about the contiguous zone: serious obstacles may be posed to reasonable
accommodation of the new claims certain to emerge from the onrushing de-
velopments of science and technology. 1 64 To the extent that the conceptual
rigidity displayed by the Commission precludes flexibility in responding to
claims of limited authority for special purposes over noncontiguous high seas
areas, the Commission may have created new occasions for conflict instead
of removing old.
If clarification be a goal in codification, the solution to the difficulty of "de-
fining" freedom of the seas does not appear to lie in a mere listing of the various
freedoms which it is said to comprise; as already observed, even these freedoms
conflict in particular instances and must, therefore, also be accommodated.
Appropriate reconciliation here, as elsewhere, appears feasible only through
a conscious and explicit consideration of the relevant factors to be weighed
in balancing the competing interests. Hence, an adequate formulation of freedom
of the seas might offer, in addition to highly abstract black-letter definitions
of inclusive interests: an explicit recognition of the lawfulness of certain ex-
162. REPORT arts. 51-59, 73. It is not intended to underemphasize these provisions. To
provide adequate procedures for presentation, consideration and decision of disputed
claims is fully as important as to clarify the criteria by which decisions are to be made.
163. Discussing the use of the seas for conducting nuclear tests, Professor Francois
urged the Commission to adopt the test of reasonableness, see text at note 101 supra,
and noted that this test "had been frequently introduced by the Commission," 1 YEAR-
BOOK 11.
164. Thus, in the course of the Commission's discussions, Mr. Zourek, apparently
referring to McDougal & Schlei, supra note 153, stated, inter alia: "[A]n article published
in the YALE LAW JOURMAL, had concluded that such experiments, even if they violated the
freedom of the high seas, were permissible if they could be claimed to be 'reasonable.' "
1 YEARmoK 31. This was completely to miss the point of the article. The point was
that "freedom of the seas" could be authoritatively defined only by a balancing of opposing
claims and interests and by according an appropriate meaning to equally historic legal
concepts designed to protect interests other than navigation and fishing.
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clusive claims; a careful demonstration of the relativity of all interests, inclusive
as well as exclusive, in terms both of physical use and of potential values; an
invitation, more solicitious than that expressed in the Latin inter alia, to the
acceptance and honoring of new uses, made possible by advancing technology;
an explicit weighting of the balance of decision in favor of inclusive rather than
exclusive uses; a detailed indication of the different factors to be taken into
account in different contexts in resolving conflicts both between exclusive and
inclusive interests and between different inclusive interests; and perhaps, finally,
even the elaboration of some lower-order generalizations about the specific
weightings to be accorded the various relevant factors in differing contexts and
different disputes. 165 It is by recognition of its relativity and expansibility,
and not by proclamation of an impossible absolutism, that "freedom of the
seas" may best be preserved as abiding authority for continued and possibly
even greater service to the community of mankind.
RECIPROCAL INTERESTS DEMAND MUTUAL RESTRAINT
These observations have not been designed to minimize the potentialities
either of collective clarification of community policies about the use of the
oceans or of explicit multilateral agreement, when such agreement can be
obtained, for projecting such clarified policies into the future. It has rather
been our purpose to emphasize the overwhelming self-interest of all states in
continuing to maintain a community consensus which weights decision in favor
of inclusive rather than exclusive claims and which requires of all states an
offer of reciprocity in the assertion of claims and the exercise of severe restraint
in the application of naked power. The importance of such continued com-
munity consensus we have sought to document principally by recalling the
tremendous net gain in community and particular values achieved by such
consensus and by indicating the kind of process of decision, a process which
affords a continuous balancing of competing claims in terms of reasonableness
under community criteria, upon which such net gain depends. The lesson of this
165. The objection may be raised that the Commission in its formulations in terms
of "freedoms" on the one hand and "regulation" on the other was merely trying, by certain
traditional language, to do all these things. The strain that the imputation of such compre-
hensive purpose to the Commission imposes upon the words actually employed by it may,
however, be indicated by direct juxtaposition of the major propositions in sequence as
follows:
1. Freedom of the seas refers to freedom of navigation, fishing, flying, etc.
2. No state may exercise jurisdiction over any part of the high seas.
3. International law recognizes the exercise of certain forms of exclusive coastal juris-
diction over the high seas, but this jurisdiction is not designed to limit or restrict freedom
of navigation, fishing, etc.
4. The specific incidents of jurisdiction a coastal state may exercise may limit or restrict
the freedom of navigation, fishing, etc.
Even by traditional usage, statement two is contradicted by statement three, and the
latter is contradicted by statement four. Surely, language can be devised which would
better serve the purposes of clarification.
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collective experience in the past is, however, only fortified when one reflects
upon the probable conditions of the future and upon the alternatives to such
a consensus. It would seem certain that increasing scientific knowledge and
improving technology will continue to increase tremendously the net values
recoverable from the oceans, and that the rapidly accelerating industrialization
of the world will with equal acceleration increase the effective capacity of all
states to participate in the recovery of these values. It would also seem reason-
able to expect that, despite the increasing relative importance of control of the
air, access by sea and the maintenance of buffer zones will continue to be of great
importance to the security of states. All the factors which have in the past made
the internationalization of the oceans important in maximizing the values of
states would thus seem, when projected into the future, to make a similar con-
sensus and process of decision indispensable. The alternative to such con-
sensus-the unrestrained exercise of naked power, so dramatically illustrated
in all the recent unilateral assertions and enforcements of exclusive claims
against general consent-should be carefully considered, or reconsidered, by
any state, and this might include all states, not certain in the contemporary world
arena of its ability to assert more effective power than any possible rival
claimant.10 Once our inherited authoritative consensus upon international-
ization is irrevocably breached, and it has already suffered grievous injury, the
great ocean riches which historically have been available to all will be up for
grabs by the most powerful and the most ruthless.1 7 States concerned for
their long-term national interest might be better advised not to destroy their
equality of access to inclusive uses of the oceans, but to increase their effective
capacity for the fuller enjoyment of their existing common rights. The law
of the sea, like all international law, serves only the function of protecting
common interest against the dissentient powerful and lawless. Its only ultimate
sanction, in a decentralized world, is in the mutual restraint and tolerance
which inhere in a recognition of common interest.0 8 The choice before the
states of the world in the present crisis of the law of the sea is whether, for the
illusory mess of pottage obtainable in an uneconomic extension of exclusive
right, they will forego their heritage of inclusive rights and its promise of even
greater future achievement in community and particular values.
166. The continued interest of smaller powers in inclusive uses was eloquently stated
by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in the Sixth Committee debates. 1 VEPBATIm REco1 244-45.
Even landlocked countries have an interest in having the oceans kept open for inclusive
uses by others on their behalf.
167. Thus, paradoxically, for a great power seeking to preserve consensus upon a
narrow territorial belt, the best immediate tactic might be to assert a claim for hundreds
of miles.
168. The same point has been well made by Professor Katzenbach about all private
international law. "Comity implies a similar objective measured in public terms: reciprocal
self-restraint rather than mutual policy frustration." Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly
Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE
L.J. 1087, 1107 (1956).
1958]
HeinOnline -- 67 Yale L.J. 589 1957-1958
